← Energy Realism

China's Footprint

Australia is spending A$173bn to reduce one dependence (imported fuel) by deepening another. The renewable build runs through Chinese refineries and factories at almost every critical node. This is the Unpreparedthesis, applied to the grid: the vulnerability isn't the ore — it's the midstream.

We dig it. China builds it. We buy it back.

Australia — digs up the raw materials China — refines & builds it→ raw ore out, finished panels & batteries back
~95%
of Australian spodumene shipped to China to refine
95%
of the world's solar polysilicon refined in China
90%
of battery-grade graphite processed in China

The chokehold is refining, not mining

The China chokehold is MIDSTREAM — refining and manufacturing, not ore in the ground. Australia mines lithium, silica and rare earths; the vulnerability is the refinery and the factory.

Silicon / polysilicon95% China
~95% polysilicon, ~97% wafers — the most concentrated node of all
Graphite90% China
>90% battery-grade processing; China export controls since 2023
Rare earths (Nd, Dy)90% China
~90% separation/refining; ~85–94% magnet manufacture
Silver80% China
cell metallisation; silver mining itself distributed
Lithium67% China
refining; AU mines the most spodumene but ~95% ships to China to refine
Copper44% China
refining (mining ~8%, distributed)

The bulk materials — less concentrated, but not free

Glass85%
Polymers / composites78%
Aluminium59%
Steel12%
Concrete0%

Why it can't be swapped out quickly

The IEA's own stress test finds that for graphite and rare earths, non-China supply would cover only ~35–40% of demand-minus-largest-supplier by 2035. China has already shown its hand — export controls on graphite (2023) and rare-earth processing technology (2024–25). A grid built on this supply chain is a grid whose build rate Beijing can throttle. That is precisely the kind of strategic exposure Unprepared was written about — only here Australia is choosing it, A$173bn at a time.