Grey Zone Activities

First PLAN surface action group (cruiser Zunyi, frigate Hengyang, oiler Weishanhu) to circumnavigate Australia; conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea 21–22 Feb 2025 with no NOTAM warning, forcing commercial flights between Australia and NZ to divert. Lawful but norm-breaking — a step-change in PLAN reach.

On 14 Nov 2023 the PLAN destroyer Ningbo operated hull-mounted sonar while RAN divers were clearing nets in international waters, despite a diving-in-progress broadcast; divers sustained minor injuries. Albanese called it "dangerous and unprofessional"; China disputed the account.

A pattern of unsafe J-16 intercepts of RAAF P-8A maritime patrol aircraft over the South China Sea: chaff ingested into an engine (May 2022), flares within ~30m (Feb 2025), flares again (Oct 2025). China each time claims "legitimate" expulsion from claimed airspace.

On 4 May 2024 a J-10 dropped flares ~300m ahead of a RAN Seahawk (from HMAS Hobart) enforcing UN sanctions on North Korea in international waters; the helicopter took evasive action. Marles called it "unsafe and unprofessional."

Since 2017, Type 815 Dongdiao-class auxiliary intelligence ships have entered Australia's EEZ to monitor the biennial US–Australia exercise off Queensland (2017, 2019, 2021, 2023, 2025) — lawful-but-unwelcome surveillance inside the EEZ.

In Mar–Apr 2025 the deep-sea survey ship (dual civil-military links) entered Australia's EEZ southwest of Melbourne, transited Bass Strait and ran along the southern coast near undersea-cable routes en route to the Diamantina Trench off WA. Lawful under UNCLOS; the concern is dual-use intent.

Chinese government vessels entered the contiguous zone around the Japan-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on 357 of 365 days in 2025 — the highest since China first sent official vessels to the area in 2008, a fourth consecutive annual record (up from 355 days in 2024), with 1,380 vessels logged. China contests Japan's administration, claiming the islets ('Diaoyu') as inherent Chinese territory and framing CCG patrols as lawful sovereignty enforcement. The sustained presence is widely assessed as lawful-but-norm-breaking salami-slicing designed to normalise a Chinese presence and erode Japan's effective control.

Chinese Coast Guard vessels maintained an unbroken presence in the Senkakus' contiguous zone for 335 consecutive days from 19 Nov 2024 to 19 Oct 2025 (streak ending 20 Oct 2025), shattering the prior 215-day record (22 Dec 2023-23 Jul 2024). Beijing characterises the patrols as routine law-enforcement in 'Chinese' waters; Japan and analysts view the endurance milestone as deliberate pressure to establish a permanent footprint short of armed conflict. Japan's coast guard suggested weather contributed to the eventual pullback.

China Coast Guard repeatedly water-cannoned and rammed Philippine resupply boats (Dec 2023–Mar 2024, injuring sailors); around Scarborough Shoal it raised patrols to ~95 ship-days/month in 2025, erected a floating barrier, and collided with a PLAN warship (Aug 2025). The canonical paramilitary grey-zone rung Australia could face.

On 17 Jun 2024 China Coast Guard personnel in small boats, backed by maritime militia and the PLA Navy, surrounded, rammed, boarded and punctured two Philippine Navy RHIBs during a resupply run to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre. CCG crew wielded knives, axes and pointed tools, seized seven firearms and other equipment, and Philippine Navy diver Jeffrey Facundo lost his right thumb. China called its 'necessary measures' lawful, professional and restrained and blamed Manila for the 'illegal' intrusion; the boarding and use of bladed weapons against sailors is widely assessed as outright illegal, not merely norm-breaking.

On 23-24 May 2024 the PLA Eastern Theater Command ran 'Joint Sword-2024A', large-scale joint army/navy/air/rocket-force drills around Taiwan and its outlying islands (Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, Dongyin), launched three days after President Lai Ching-te's 20 May inauguration. Over the two days Taiwan detected roughly 111 PLA aircraft (around 82 entering its ADIZ / crossing the median line) and ~46-53 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels combined; on the first day (23 May) alone CSIS counted ~49 aircraft (35 crossing the median line/entering the ADIZ), ~19 PLAN warships and ~16 coast guard vessels, with higher numbers on 24 May. The exercise practiced joint sea-air combat-readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets, and was distinct from the follow-on Joint Sword-2024B (begun 14 Oct 2024). China's counter-framing: the Eastern Theater Command spokesman called it 'a strong punishment for the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces', and Chinese state media argued the drill was legitimate and justified. The drills were lawful-but-norm-breaking coercive signalling rather than a clear breach of law, but the many median-line crossings and approaches toward Taiwan's contiguous/ADIZ zones eroded long-standing norms.

On 14 Oct 2024, days after President Lai's National Day speech, the PLA ran Joint Sword-2024B with a record 153 operational aircraft in one day and ~14 PLAN vessels, plus 12 China Coast Guard ships that circumnavigated Taiwan in an unprecedented 'law-enforcement' formation. Beijing framed it as practical enforcement of the One China principle and a key-port 'quarantine' drill; Taiwan and analysts (Jamestown, GTI) read it as a rehearsal of quarantine/blockade — coercive and norm-breaking rather than an armed attack.

On 21 Sep 2020 MFA spokesman Wang Wenbin publicly denied the existence of the Taiwan Strait median line, a tacit buffer Beijing had observed for decades; PLA aircraft and ships have since crossed routinely. Per Taiwan MND/Jane's, ADIZ incursions rose from 1,669 PLA aircraft in 2023 to a record 3,615 in 2024; a Jamestown analysis found median-line-crossing PLAAF sorties jumped to roughly 3,070 (an increase of about 1,367 over 2023). China frames the flights as 'routine' patrols and rejects the line's legality; the activity is coercive and norm-breaking but conducted in international/disputed airspace rather than clearly illegal.

AMTI AIS analysis found the China Coast Guard logged 933 ship-days at Scarborough in Jan-Jun 2026 (monthly avg 156, peaking at 216 in May), nearly matching 2025's full-year 1,099 and the highest CCG activity anywhere in the South China Sea since AMTI began tracking in 2019, with 6-8 maritime-militia vessels holding an inner perimeter and 112 interaction-days with Philippine ships, including a May 27 encounter between CCG 21563 and BRP Datu Pagbuaya. Beijing also placed a 6x6m floating platform inside the lagoon (removed June 17), which China's embassy in Manila framed as a 'temporary research facility' collecting ecosystem data, not a coercive structure.

On 22 June 2026, four armed Haijing-class China Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese territorial waters off Minamikojima in the Senkakus for roughly two hours, coinciding with unprecedented simultaneous operations by China's Liaoning and Shandong carriers in the western Pacific and an incident in which a Chinese aircraft closed to about 45 meters of a Japanese aircraft. The activity followed heightened tensions after PM Sanae Takaichi's remark that a Taiwan conflict could be a 'survival-threatening situation'; Beijing treats the Senkakus (Diaoyu) as disputed territory and casts such patrols as lawful sovereignty enforcement.

After a first-ever joint US-Philippine coast guard patrol near Scarborough Shoal (26-30 May 2026), the PLA Southern Theater Command and China Coast Guard announced exercises around the shoal, framed as countering 'rights-violation and provocative acts'; the Philippine military dismissed the drills. At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said he was investigating preliminary ('raw') reports of potential structures being placed at Scarborough, echoing the pattern that preceded China's full militarization of Spratly reefs, following Beijing's declaration of a 'national nature reserve' at the shoal in late 2025.

Taiwan recorded five undersea-cable malfunctions in the first ~quarter of 2025, up from three in each of 2023 and 2024 — a pattern beyond the prosecuted Hong Tai 58 / Hongtai 58 case (Togo-flagged, suspected Chinese crew; severed the Taiwan-Penghu TPKM-3 cable Feb 2025; captain sentenced to 3 years in June 2025 under the Telecommunications Management Act, Taiwan's first such conviction) and the Shunxing 39 / Xingshun 39 incident (Jan 2025, Tanzania/Cameroon-flag-of-convenience vessel near Keelung). Most cases involve China-linked flag-of-convenience vessels dragging anchors near cables; only the Hong Tai 58 was prosecuted, with most others below a clear-illegality threshold and hard to attribute. In parallel, the China Ship Scientific Research Center (CSSRC) and its State Key Laboratory of Deep-Sea Manned Vehicles disclosed a device able to sever armored cables at depths up to 4,000m (a 150mm diamond-impregnated saw at 1,600rpm) in a paper in the journal Mechanical Engineer dated 24 Feb 2025, surfaced internationally by SCMP on 21 Mar 2025 — reported as the first public disclosure of such a capability by any nation. China counter-frames the cable incidents, accusing Taipei/the DPP of 'politicising' and 'manipulating' cable damage to 'stir cross-Strait confrontation,' and casts the cutter as for marine scientific research and salvage. The cutter is presented as lawful dual-use research; the cable incidents are deliberately ambiguous grey-zone activity (one prosecuted as a crime; most below a clear-illegality threshold).

In June 2025 the carriers Liaoning and Shandong operated simultaneously in the Western Pacific beyond the Second Island Chain for the first time, with Liaoning the first Chinese carrier Japan's MOD recorded crossing that line. The Liaoning group entered Japan's EEZ near Minamitorishima on 7 June and the Shandong group entered the EEZ near Okinotorishima on 9 June, conducting flight drills. Japan tracked roughly 1,050 combined air operations near the archipelago and raised concerns with Beijing. China called it routine 'far-sea' training; operations in international waters/EEZ are lawful but the scale and proximity were assessed as a deliberate show of force.

During a months-long 2024 standoff at Sabina (Escoda) Shoal, where the PCG deployed flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua over suspected Chinese reclamation, CCG vessel 5205 rammed the ship three times on 31 Aug 2024, punching a hole in the hull and damaging the bridge wing; multiple CCG ships and two PLAN tugs surrounded it. The Philippines withdrew the vessel on 14 Sep 2024. China blamed Philippine 'provocations' and said the PCG ship rammed CCG 5205; the deliberate high-speed rammings are widely assessed as unsafe and unlawful under collision-prevention norms.

China has emplaced large fixed structures inside the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the Yellow Sea: the Shen Lan 1 aquaculture cage (installed July 2018), the larger Shen Lan 2 (~70m diameter/71.5m tall, installed May 2024), and a converted offshore platform dubbed 'Atlantic Amsterdam' (in place since Oct 2022, replacing an earlier rig) refitted as an integrated management hub with crew housing, lab and control facilities. In late February 2025 (incident ~26 Feb) the Chinese Coast Guard, with civilian boats, blocked the South Korean research vessel Onnuri from surveying the structures inside the PMZ, prompting an hours-long standoff. Beijing calls the installations private 'deep-sea aquaculture facilities'; Seoul fears dual-use ISR potential and treats the obstruction as coercive.

On 16 Sep 2025 two CCG ships and a maritime-militia vessel performed dangerous maneuvers and fired water cannons at the BFAR vessel BRP Datu Gumbay Piang during a Kadiwa fisherfolk-support mission ~14 nm east of Scarborough Shoal; a water-cannon blast shattered a bridge window, injuring a sailor with lacerations and causing damage. China alleged an illegal incursion and said it acted lawfully to expel the vessel; high-pressure water cannons against a civilian-support mission are assessed as coercive and norm-breaking, part of a recurring 2023-2025 pattern.

Since 2019 Chinese and Russian military aircraft have repeatedly flown into the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) without prior notice during joint 'strategic cruises.' On 29 Nov 2024, eleven aircraft (five Chinese, six Russian) transited the East/South Sea KADIZ (the ninth joint patrol since 2019); on 9 Dec 2025, nine aircraft (two Chinese, seven Russian) did so for about an hour. None violated sovereign airspace, but the ROK scrambled fighters and lodged protests. China frames the flights as routine, lawful joint training in international airspace (an ADIZ is not territorial airspace), making this lawful-but-norm-breaking signalling rather than illegal incursion.

On 14 Feb 2024 a Chinese speedboat in prohibited waters off Kinmen capsized during a Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit/collision, killing two of four crew. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office condemned the deaths and the CCG began regular 'law-enforcement' patrols into Kinmen's restricted/prohibited waters, including boarding a Taiwanese tour boat, asserting it does not recognize Taiwan's self-declared zones. This established a recurring presence that erodes Taiwan's administrative control; lawful-but-norm-breaking under Beijing's framing, an incursion under Taipei's.

On 30 March 2026, Japan's Coast Guard tracked the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 22 about 40 miles west-northwest of Uotsuri Island, deploying pipe-like objects from both sides of its hull and wire-like gear from its stern into Japan's exclusive economic zone; the JCG radioed that oceanographic research without Japan's consent was unacceptable and demanded it cease. Beijing does not recognize Japan's jurisdiction over the waters, framing such survey work as legitimate activity in its own claimed maritime space.

Early on 18 Sept 2024 the carrier Liaoning and two destroyers entered Japan's contiguous zone, sailing between Yonaguni and Iriomote near Taiwan — the first time a Chinese aircraft carrier had operated in Japan's contiguous zone. Tokyo conveyed serious concerns to Beijing. Transit of the contiguous zone is lawful under UNCLOS, but the move was read as coercive signalling.

In June 2022 Canada said PLA fighter jets repeatedly intercepted RCAF CP-140 Aurora aircraft (some coming within tens of metres) flying UN-mandated patrols monitoring North Korea sanctions evasion, forcing crews to alter course. On 16 October 2023 Canada's defence minister condemned a 'dangerous and reckless' intercept in which a PLA jet closed to within about five metres and released flares over international waters, witnessed by senior officers and embedded reporters. China casts such missions as illegal intrusions near its airspace; the intercepts are lawful-but-norm-breaking, breaching international air-safety conventions.

On 26 Aug 2024 a PLA Shaanxi Y-9 intelligence aircraft entered Japanese territorial airspace near the Danjo Islands (off Nagasaki Pref.) for roughly two minutes (11:29-11:31 local), prompting Japan to scramble fighters. Japan's MOD assessed it as the first confirmed intrusion of sovereign Japanese airspace by a Chinese military aircraft on record. Tokyo lodged a severe protest; China later acknowledged the flight but denied intent to violate Japanese airspace. The act is an outright violation of Japanese sovereignty/airspace.

After the Feb 2023 US shoot-down of a Chinese surveillance balloon, Japan's Ministry of Defense reassessed three 'balloon-shaped flying objects' detected over its territory in Nov 2019, June 2020 and Sept 2021 and on 14-15 Feb 2023 stated it 'strongly presumes' they were Chinese unmanned reconnaissance craft, asking China to confirm the facts and demanding such incursions not recur. Beijing rejected the claim. If confirmed Chinese, the overflights are violations of Japanese airspace; attribution rests on Japanese government assessment rather than physical recovery, hence medium confidence.

In February 2025 a PLA Navy South Theater Command task group (Type 055/Renhai-class Zunyi, Type 054A/Jiangkai frigate Hengyang, Type 903 replenishment ship Weishanhu) operated near Australia and conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea between Australia and NZ on 21-22 Feb 2025; the first warning reached a Virgin Australia pilot via an international/emergency guard frequency, prompting a hazard alert and roughly 49 flight diversions. HMNZS Te Kaha shadowed the group, and crew reported observing the Renhai-class cruiser firing its main gun. The ships were in international waters and the drills were within international law, but the short notice broke customary advisory practice (no NOTAM). China said the exercises were lawful and safe and that notice had been given.

In March 2021 the Philippines reported ~220 Chinese vessels assessed as maritime militia moored in line formation at Whitsun Reef (Julian Felipe) inside its EEZ, showing no fishing activity and lighting up at night; some had reportedly been present since late 2020. Defence Secretary Lorenzana publicly demanded their departure on ~20-21 Mar 2021, backed by a DFA diplomatic protest. China's embassy called it 'normal' sheltering by fishing boats from rough seas; analysts and the Philippines viewed the swarm as a coercive militia presence and possible 'prelude to occupation' rather than genuine fishing.

On 6 Feb 2023 China Coast Guard vessel 5205 twice directed a green laser at the PCG's BRP Malapascua near Second Thomas Shoal, causing temporary blindness to bridge crew while maneuvering dangerously (~137m) to block a resupply mission. The US State Department called the act 'provocative and unsafe.' China said its operations were lawful and that the Philippine ship had intruded without permission and denied the laser was military-grade; the PCG assessed it as a coercive, norm-breaking tactic kept below the use-of-force threshold.

After Taiwan's MND began publicly tracking such balloons in Dec 2023, it logged near-daily PLA balloons crossing the median line through Feb 2024, several passing over the island, peaking at a record six balloons in 24 hours on 11 Feb 2024 at altitudes up to ~10,668 m. Taipei labelled the flights 'gray-zone' harassment and cognitive warfare meant to rattle voters before the 13 Jan election; Beijing offered no acknowledgement, making the act ambiguous/norm-breaking rather than clearly illegal.

From ~June 2020 large fleets of Chinese sand dredgers swarmed waters near the Matsu Islands; Taiwan's Coast Guard expelled nearly 4,000 dredger/sand-transport vessels in 2020 (a ~560% jump over 2019), prompting round-the-clock patrols and a 2021 legal amendment raising penalties to up to seven years' jail. Beijing characterized the activity as ordinary commercial dredging; Taipei treated it as gray-zone harassment that damaged seabed and undersea infrastructure — a mix of illegal incursions into Taiwan-controlled waters and exhaustion tactics.

A PRC high-altitude balloon assessed to carry surveillance/SIGINT sensors was first tracked over Alaska ~28 Jan 2023 and transited the continental US before an F-22 from Langley downed it with an AIM-9X off South Carolina on 4 Feb 2023; the Pentagon recovered collection gear. NORAD/NORTHCOM commander Gen. Glen VanHerck said radars had been filtering out such slow, high targets, exposing a detection gap that was later recalibrated. The overflight of sovereign airspace was an incursion; Beijing claimed it was a civilian weather/research airship blown off course.

On 3 Jun 2023, during a joint US-Canada transit (with HMCS Montreal), a PLA Navy Type 052D Luyang III destroyer (identified as CNS Suzhou, hull 132) overtook the destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and crossed its bow at ~150 yards, forcing the US ship to slow to 10 knots to avoid collision; USINDOPACOM released video and called the maneuver unsafe and in violation of maritime Rules of the Road in international waters. China's MFA framed the transit as a provocation and defended its own conduct as lawful.

On 21 Dec 2022 a PLA Navy J-11 flew within ~20 feet of the nose of a US Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft (about 30 crew aboard) in international airspace over the South China Sea, forcing the RC-135 to take evasive action; USINDOPACOM disclosed the incident on 29 Dec 2022. The US flight was lawful routine operations; the intercept was unsafe under air-safety conventions. China blamed the US, asserting its reconnaissance flights near Chinese coasts provoke such responses and that the RC-135 manoeuvred toward the fighter.

On 17-18 Nov 2024 two Baltic data cables were severed — the BCS East-West Interlink (Sweden-Lithuania) and C-Lion1 (Finland-Germany). Tracking data placed the Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3, which had sailed from Russia's Ust-Luga, at both sites; investigators suspect its crew dragged an anchor across the seabed for roughly 100 miles. China let Danish, Swedish, Finnish and German investigators observe a Chinese-led inspection aboard the vessel only under Chinese supervision in Dec 2024, before the ship was allowed to depart; Sweden disputed China's characterisation of "cooperation." Sabotage remains unproven, and early suspicion also centred on possible Russian inducement of the crew; if deliberate it would be illegal, but the deniable, supervised handling is classic grey-zone norm-breaking.

On 15 June 2020, PLA and Indian troops fought hand-to-hand with stones and nail-studded clubs near Patrolling Point 14 in the Galwan Valley, eastern Ladakh; 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the deadliest India-China border clash in over 40 years. Beijing did not acknowledge casualties until February 2021, when it conceded four PLA deaths (India and outside estimates put the Chinese toll higher), and China laid claim to the Galwan Valley while blaming India for the violence. The clash followed the PLA's spring-2020 forward deployment into India-claimed areas; deliberately fought without firearms under the 1996/2005 confidence-building agreements, it sits between lawful-but-norm-breaking coercion and unlawful use of force across the disputed boundary.

During a 2013/14-2016 dredging spree China created roughly 3,200 acres of new land across seven Spratly features. The 'Big Three' - Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross reefs - each gained a ~10,000-ft runway, hardened aircraft hangars, fuel/munitions storage and radar arrays, later fitted with anti-ship and anti-air missile systems. This broke Xi Jinping's 25 Sep 2015 White House Rose Garden pledge, alongside President Obama, that China 'does not intend to pursue militarization' of the Spratlys. US Indo-Pacific Command's Adm. John Aquilino said in March 2022 (AP) that the three islands had been 'fully militarized' with anti-ship/anti-air missiles, jamming gear and fighter capacity. The 12 Jul 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration award (Annex VII UNCLOS tribunal) found China's Mischief Reef construction unlawful and that the nine-dash line / claimed historic rights have no legal basis - making this both illegal under the tribunal and a clear pledge violation. China's counter-framing: it claims 'indisputable sovereignty,' calls the 2016 ruling 'null and void' and non-binding (non-acceptance/non-recognition), and characterizes the facilities as defensive/civilian and necessary for navigation safety and self-defense.

On 29 September 2024 China Maritime Safety Administration vessels of the Sansha City united law-enforcement unit (hull numbers 101 and 301) surrounded Vietnamese fishing boat QNg 95739 TS near the Paracel Islands; up to 40 personnel boarded and beat the crew with metal rods, breaking limbs and seriously injuring four (all 10 aboard were hurt), and confiscated catch and equipment. Vietnam protested the 'brutal' attack and the Philippines also condemned it. Beijing's foreign ministry framed the operation against 'illegal fishing' as 'professional and restrained' — disputed as an illegal use of force against civilians.

On 1 May 2014 China's CNOOC moved the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) drilling rig into disputed waters south of the Paracels, escorted by dozens of Chinese vessels. Chinese ships repeatedly rammed and water-cannoned Vietnamese coast-guard and fisheries craft; on 26 May a Vietnamese fishing boat was rammed and sunk (its 10 crew were rescued). The rig withdrew in mid-July; the crisis triggered deadly anti-China riots in Vietnam. China asserted the rig sat in its own waters near the Paracels; the deployment and ramming were widely judged coercive and contrary to maritime safety norms.

Chinese-owned vessels have severed European seabed infrastructure by dragging anchors: the Hong Kong-flagged box ship NewNew Polar Bear (NewNew Shipping) damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline and an Estonia-Finland data cable (8 Oct 2023; Finnish investigators recovered the 6-tonne anchor, China later acknowledged its ship was involved and called it a storm accident), and bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 dragged its anchor ~150nm over the BCS East-West (Lithuania-Sweden) and C-Lion1 (Finland-Germany) cables (17-18 Nov 2024). Investigators noted intent was hard to prove definitively. China denies deliberate sabotage and urges 'objective' investigation. If accidental it is lawful; if deliberate it is illegal sabotage - the deniability is the point.

From April-May 2020 the PLA blocked Indian access at multiple friction points in eastern Ladakh, including the Depsang Plains 'Y-Junction' and Pangong Tso, where India had patrolled to Finger 8 but was pushed back toward Finger 4. Subsequent disengagement deals (notably Feb 2021 at Pangong Tso) created mutual no-patrol 'buffer zones' largely on India-claimed ground, a salami-slicing pattern critics in India called a de facto loss of access; China casts the arrangements as mutual de-escalation. The unilateral blockade of longstanding patrol limits is norm-breaking grey-zone coercion short of declared force.

From mid-December 2019, Indonesian authorities detected dozens of Chinese fishing vessels escorted by China Coast Guard cutters fishing inside Indonesia's EEZ in the North Natuna Sea. Jakarta filed a protest, deployed naval ships and four F-16s to Natuna, and President Jokowi visited the islands; the vessels withdrew by early January 2020. Beijing claimed the area was a 'traditional fishing ground' over which China has rights. The mass illegal fishing under state-vessel escort is unlawful under UNCLOS, with the state-backed coordination making it a deliberate grey-zone incursion.

From July 2021, after the rig Noble Clyde Boudreaux began drilling appraisal wells in Indonesia's Tuna block in the Natuna Sea, a Chinese coast guard ship told the rig to cease operations as 'trespassing,' and over the following ~four months Chinese and Indonesian vessels shadowed each other near the field, frequently within ~1nm. Reuters reported China separately sent a diplomatic letter telling Indonesia to halt the drilling; China also deployed the Haiyang Dizhi 10 survey ship to the area Aug-Oct 2021. Beijing asserts nine-dash-line 'historic rights'; the Tuna block lies within Indonesia's EEZ, so the demand and loitering pressure lawful activity.

From late 2019 to May 2020, China dispatched coast guard cutters and maritime militia to harass the Petronas-contracted drillship West Capella in Malaysia's EEZ; on 15-16 April 2020 the survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 with escorts began surveying the Malaysian continental shelf nearby, prompting US Navy (USS America, Bunker Hill, Barry; LCS Gabrielle Giffords, Montgomery) and Royal Australian Navy (HMAS Parramatta) presence operations through late April. The West Capella returned to the Bay of Brunei on 12 May; the Haiyang Dizhi 8 departed three days later. Beijing frames such patrols as protecting 'historic rights' inside the nine-dash line; the harassment occurred in Malaysia's UNCLOS EEZ, making it lawful-but-norm-breaking pressure rather than clearly illegal seizure.

From early July to late October 2019 China's survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8, escorted by large China Coast Guard vessels including the ~12,000-ton Haijing 3901, conducted seismic surveys inside Vietnam's UNCLOS EEZ around Vanguard Bank, coercing Vietnamese oil and gas activity. The US condemned China's 'bullying'; Beijing framed the area as Chinese 'jurisdictional waters' and accused Vietnam of violating its rights. The survey work itself looked routine, but the entry into Vietnam's EEZ without consent and the coercive escort presence breached UNCLOS norms.

China operates the world's largest distant-water fishing fleet (estimated 2,000-16,000 vessels when militia-linked and foreign-flagged craft are counted; drove ~44% of global fishing effort 2022-2024), with vessels reaching off Argentina, West Africa and Latin America - frequently 'going dark' by switching off AIS, flagging out, and using banned gear, while militia-organised hulls preserve plausible deniability. Hundreds of Chinese boats mass at the edge of Argentina's EEZ (350+ detected in Dec 2025). Beijing says its fleet complies with regulations and that subsidies are normal industrial policy. IUU fishing and AIS-dark incursions into EEZs are illegal; the militia/grey-zone organisation around them is the norm-breaking layer.

On 21 October 2024 India and China announced a patrolling arrangement for the Depsang Bulge and Demchok (Charding-Ninglung Nala junction), the last two blockaded friction points, with disengagement beginning 22 October and patrolling restored toward pre-2020 levels at those two points. The deal partially rolled back the post-2020 status quo, but Indian statements acknowledged that moratoria/buffer zones at Galwan and Pangong continue, a managed grey-zone outcome rather than full restoration of pre-2020 patrolling everywhere.

In late October 2024 Indonesia's maritime security agency Bakamla, reinforced by the navy ship KRI Sutedi Senaputera 378, expelled China Coast Guard vessel 5402 after it entered Indonesia's EEZ and interfered with a seismic survey by PT Pertamina East Natuna aboard the MV Geo Coral; CCG-5402 re-entered the same waters repeatedly (three expulsions in late October). China maintains the area lies within its claimed jurisdiction. Interfering with a survey lawfully authorised by the coastal state inside its EEZ is a norm-breaking and arguably unlawful intrusion under UNCLOS.

The 12,000-tonne mega-cutter CCG-5901 entered Indonesia's EEZ on 30 Dec 2022 and lingered near the Tuna gas block (and reportedly near the Vietnamese Chim Sao field); Indonesia's navy deployed a warship, maritime patrol aircraft and drone to monitor it into mid-January 2023. Navy chief Adm. Muhammad Ali said the vessel conducted no 'suspicious' activity but had to be monitored. The patrol fell inside Indonesia's EEZ but within China's nine-dash-line claim, read by analysts as a signal against the newly approved Tuna development; lawful-but-norm-breaking presence.

AMTI's remote-sensing study (1 Jan-30 Sep 2024) found China Coast Guard vessels rotating through Luconia Shoals ~80nm off Sarawak with a cutter on station nearly every calendar day (a ship logged on station some 359 days), passing close to Malaysian production platforms. China asserts the waters fall inside its nine/ten-dash line; Kuala Lumpur treats them as its EEZ and PM Anwar publicly affirmed Malaysia would continue extracting oil and gas. The persistent presence is coercive and norm-breaking but stops short of physical interdiction.

After a roughly 10-week standoff that began on 8 April 2012 (a Philippine aircraft spotted Chinese fishing vessels at the disputed reef and Manila dispatched a navy frigate to apprehend the fishermen for alleged illegal harvesting, only to be blocked by China Marine Surveillance ships), the US (Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell with Vice FM Fu Ying) sought to broker a mutual withdrawal in early June. Manila withdrew its two vessels on 15 June 2012, but Chinese surveillance ships remained, blockaded the lagoon and barred Filipino fishermen, amounting to a de facto transfer of control to Beijing that has persisted since. Former Philippine envoy to the US Jose Cuisia Jr. publicly stated China reneged on the joint-withdrawal understanding, calling it 'duplicitous and deceitful.' China disputes this framing: Beijing maintains the shoal (Huangyan Dao) is sovereign Chinese territory, rejected internationalization of the dispute, and Chinese accounts (e.g. SCSPI) plus Fu Ying argue no firm reciprocal-withdrawal deal was ever concluded and that Chinese law-enforcement vessels acted to protect Chinese fishermen. Widely cited as the foundational precedent for China's grey-zone seizure model in the South China Sea.

CSIS AMTI logged a daily average of 241 maritime-militia vessels across the South China Sea in 2025 (up from 232 in 2024, 195 in 2023); the Whitsun Reef swarm (~220 vessels, Mar 2021) established the tactic. From satellite tracking.

The ~12,000-ton China Coast Guard cutter 5901 (the world's largest, nicknamed 'The Monster') ran intrusive patrols across Vietnam's offshore oil and gas blocks west of Vanguard Bank in 2023 and resumed an on-and-off presence from at least 9 December 2023 into early 2024 (last AIS ping 7 Jan 2024; it left Sanya again 14 Feb 2024), rotating with other CCG cutters (e.g. CCG 5402) to maintain near-constant pressure inside Vietnam's EEZ. Vietnamese fisheries vessels shadowed it. China casts such patrols as routine 'law enforcement'; the sustained EEZ presence is lawful-but-norm-breaking intimidation.

AMTI satellite analysis recorded a daily average of about 232 Chinese maritime-militia vessels across tracked Spratly features in 2024, rising to roughly 241 in 2025 — the highest since monitoring began in 2021 — combining a professional militia and the larger civilian 'Spratly Backbone Fishing Fleet.' Activity concentrated at Mischief and Whitsun reefs rather than Vietnamese-held features, so pressure on Vietnam is indirect, but the standing fleet contests waters Vietnam also claims. Beijing characterises these as ordinary fishing boats; analysts treat them as a state-directed grey-zone force. (2025 figures from AMTI report published Mar 2026.)

On 31 May 2021 Malaysia's air force scrambled fighter jets after detecting 16 PLA Air Force Il-76 and Y-20 transports flying in 'in-trail' formation to within ~60nm of Beting Patinggi Ali (Luconia Shoals) off Sarawak; the aircraft refused to communicate with air-traffic control. Malaysia announced a diplomatic protest, calling it a 'serious threat' to sovereignty and flight safety. Beijing's embassy said the planes conducted 'routine flight training' in line with international law. The flight stayed in airspace over Malaysia's EEZ (maritime zone airspace), so it was provocative and norm-breaking rather than an outright sovereign-airspace violation.

From mid-June 2025 the Chinese survey vessel Bei Diao 996 (departed Hainan 10 Jun, returned early Jul), first tracked by Stanford's SeaLight, repeatedly crossed into Vietnam's EEZ in a 'lawnmower' pattern near the Cam Ranh naval base. Vietnam's fisheries vessel Kiem Ngu 471 shadowed it from 19 June; SeaLight's Ray Powell flagged the intrusive survey as a grey-zone risk. Hanoi's state media stayed silent and Beijing issued no statement, consistent with surveys presented as civilian 'scientific research' that double as intelligence gathering. (Note: ship name is 'Bei Diao 996', not 'Bei Dao 996'.)

Burgess warned PRC groups (Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon) have probed and in some cases accessed Australia's telecom, energy, water and transport sectors, and that the threshold for high-impact sabotage is now reached.

On 9 Jul 2024 ASD's ACSC led a multinational advisory attributing APT40 to the PRC Ministry of State Security, stating it "has repeatedly targeted Australian government and private-sector networks," including two 2022 compromises ASD investigated.

ASIO DG Mike Burgess (Lowy Lecture, 4 Nov 2025) said PRC actors "Salt Typhoon," after penetrating US telecoms, were "probing our telecommunication networks here in Australia too." ASD co-signed the 27 Aug 2025 joint advisory attributing the campaign to PRC state actors.

In 2015 (publicly revealed by the ABC in December 2015), Australia's Bureau of Meteorology was compromised in what was described as a 'massive' intrusion; the BoM hosts a supercomputer linked to other federal agencies including Defence, so the breach risked wider government networks. ABC sources attributed the attack to China. The Australian Signals Directorate / Australian Cyber Security Centre report (released 12 Oct 2016) found a remote-access trojan (RAT) 'popular with state-sponsored cyber adversaries' plus a password-dumping utility, assessed that all network passwords were likely compromised, and concluded an unknown quantity of documents was searched, copied and likely stolen. The ACSC attributed the compromise to a 'foreign intelligence service' without publicly naming China; Beijing denied any involvement. Cyber-espionage of this kind is lawful-but-norm-breaking rather than clearly illegal.

In Feb 2019 a "sophisticated state actor" breached Parliament House and the Liberal, National and Labor party systems before the federal election; ASD assessed the PRC MSS was responsible (reported Sep 2019), though the government withheld public attribution.

A joint CISA/NSA/FBI advisory (AA24-038A, 7 Feb 2024) assessed that PRC state-sponsored actor Volt Typhoon had compromised IT environments in US communications, energy, transportation and water/wastewater systems (and US territories such as Guam), using 'living off the land' techniques to pre-position for disruptive or destructive attacks in the event of a major crisis or conflict. Agencies found persistence in some networks for at least five years. This is illegal intrusion aimed at coercive leverage, not just espionage; China disputes the attribution and characterises it as US disinformation.

PRC state-linked actors (Salt Typhoon, tied to the Ministry of State Security) breached at least nine major US telecoms including AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and Lumen, accessing call/text metadata of over a million users, the communications/geolocation of high-value targets (including 2024 candidates Trump and Vance and Harris campaign staff), and US lawful-intercept (CALEA wiretap) systems. On 17 Jan 2025 the US Treasury sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology for direct involvement; officials warned the actors may have remained resident in networks. This is outright illegal espionage/intrusion; Beijing routinely denies state-sponsored hacking and calls such attribution disinformation.

A Five Eyes investigation including ASD assessed with high confidence that PRC-sponsored Volt Typhoon was pre-positioning on IT networks to enable disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure using living-off-the-land tradecraft; ASIO later confirmed similar probing of Australian networks.

In Jan 2025 the Cameroon-then-Tanzania-linked Shunxing-39 (Chinese-linked owner) was suspected of dragging anchor across a cable off northern Taiwan; on ~22 Feb 2025 the Togo-flagged Hongtai-58, crewed by Chinese nationals, severed a Taiwan-Penghu telecoms cable off Tainan's Beimen district. Captain Wang Yuliang was convicted, sentenced to three years and ordered to pay ~US$570,000 — Taiwan's first such prosecution. Taipei calls the pattern gray-zone/hybrid sabotage by ships using deceptive identities; Beijing denies involvement and cites maritime accidents. Hard state attribution is unproven, but the Hongtai conviction established deliberate cutting.

On 16 Feb 2024 internal documents from Shanghai-based contractor i-Soon, which worked for China's MSS, MPS and the PLA, were dumped on GitHub. The trove revealed a contractor effort spanning ~8 years to breach databases and tap communications across at least 20 governments/territories, with South Korea named alongside Taiwan, Hong Kong, India and Malaysia; targets included telecom carriers (hundreds of gigabytes of call/user data reportedly taken from operators including in South Korea). Beijing routinely denies state-sponsored hacking and dismisses such reporting as smears; the leak is corroborated documentary evidence of contracted state cyber-espionage, which is unlawful intrusion under domestic law.

Resecurity reported a ~325% jump in malicious activity against the Philippines in Q1 2024 (targets ~80% government, 20% education), correlated with South China Sea tensions and tied to China-linked actors including Mustang Panda; activity mixed hack-and-leak (~55%), DDoS (~10%) and influence operations (~35%). In Jan 2025 Bloomberg reported a China state-affiliated group (APT41) had breached the Office of the President in a campaign running early 2023-mid 2024 and stole military documents on the West Philippine Sea dispute; Manila downplayed it. China routinely denies state-sponsored hacking; such espionage is unlawful intrusion. Attribution to specific APT actors carries some uncertainty.

Canada's Communications Security Establishment / Cyber Centre, with the FBI, warned in June 2025 that the PRC state-sponsored actor 'Salt Typhoon' compromised three network devices at a Canadian telecommunications provider in mid-February 2025, exploiting Cisco flaw CVE-2023-20198 to retrieve configuration files and set up a GRE tunnel to siphon traffic. CSE assessed PRC actors almost certainly targeted Canada as part of the same global espionage campaign that hit US carriers, and that such targeting will almost certainly continue. China routinely denies state-sponsored hacking. The intrusion is illegal cyberespionage.

Chinese state-linked APTs have persistently targeted South Korean strategic sectors—telecommunications, defence, semiconductors and government networks—through stealthy implants, supply-chain compromise and credential theft, with activity sustained through 2024-2025. South Korean reporting cited ~1,887 cyber breaches in H1 2025 (an all-cause figure, not China-specific). A China-nexus actor tracked by Trend Micro as Earth Bluecrow/Red Menshen (using the BPFDoor backdoor) was observed targeting telecom in South Korea and elsewhere; the major 2025 SK Telecom intrusion exposed authentication data for ~27 million customers, though definitive state attribution there remains contested. Beijing denies state direction and says it opposes all cyberattacks; attribution to specific operators is probabilistic, so individual cases vary in certainty.

On 26 March 2024 the Minister Responsible for the GCSB, Judith Collins, publicly attributed a 2021 compromise of the Parliamentary Counsel Office and Parliamentary Service (identified Aug 2021) to APT40, a PRC state-sponsored group the GCSB links to the Ministry of State Security; the GCSB's National Cyber Security Centre said the actor was contained and removed shortly after gaining access, with only non-sensitive/non-strategic data extracted. State-sponsored cyber espionage against another government's networks is generally treated as norm-breaking espionage rather than an unambiguous breach of international law. China's embassy in Wellington rejected the attribution as 'groundless and irresponsible' and dismissed it as 'megaphone diplomacy', denying state-backed hacking.

On 8 Jan 2025 Japan's National Police Agency and national cybersecurity centre publicly attributed a persistent campaign of about 200 cyber incidents since 2019 to MirrorFace (aka Earth Kasha), assessed as a subgroup of China's state-linked APT10, targeting government (Foreign and Defense ministries), the space agency, politicians, think tanks and advanced-technology firms using ANEL, LODEINFO and NOOPDOOR malware. ESET's 'Operation AkaiRyu' (Mar 2025) documented related ANEL-revival spear-phishing reaching beyond Japan. China routinely denies state-sponsored hacking and rejects such attributions as evidence-free 'smears.' State-directed cyber-espionage is an unlawful intrusion.

On 2 and 8 Feb 2023 the two submarine cables serving the Matsu Islands were severed — Taiwan attributed the first to a Chinese fishing vessel and the second to a Chinese cargo ship — leaving ~13,000 residents with degraded connectivity for nearly two months until repair. Beijing called the cuts coincidental accidents; Taiwan noted dozens of cable breaks near Matsu in prior years usually treated as accidents. Two cuts in a week raised deliberate-sabotage suspicions; attribution to a state directive remains unproven (norm-breaking, not provably illegal).

On 28 May 2025 the Czech government publicly attributed a malicious cyber campaign against an unclassified network of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to APT31, linked to China's Ministry of State Security; the assessment was reached by NUKIB together with Military Intelligence, the foreign-intelligence service (UZSI) and the Security Information Service (BIS). Intrusions ran since at least 2022, during Czechia's EU presidency. EU and NATO partners issued statements of solidarity. The Chinese embassy rejected the accusation. State-sponsored espionage of this kind is an illegal intrusion under Czech law and a breach of agreed cyber norms.

On 31 Jul 2024 Germany said Chinese state actors (reported by Der Spiegel as APT15) were behind a late-2021 espionage hack of the Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy (BKG), which prepares geographic and satellite data with intelligence applications, and summoned the Chinese ambassador — its first such summons since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. China called the claims "groundless." State-backed cyber-espionage against a government agency is an illegal intrusion and a norm violation.

In February 2021 Recorded Future's Insikt Group reported that a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, RedEcho, had targeted 10 Indian power-sector organisations - including four of India's five Regional Load Despatch Centres - and two seaports, with infrastructure encompassing ShadowPad command-and-control servers, amid the post-Galwan standoff. The activity was assessed as likely strategic pre-positioning/signalling; Recorded Future did not establish that it caused Mumbai's October 2020 blackout. Intrusion into critical infrastructure is below-threshold cyber-coercion; China routinely denies state-sponsored hacking.

On 19 Jul 2021 Australia joined the US, UK, EU, NATO, Canada, NZ and Japan in publicly attributing mass exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server to the PRC MSS, including its use of criminal contract hackers — a benchmark coordinated Western attribution.

On 25 Mar 2024 the US DOJ unsealed an indictment of seven APT31 hackers (tied to China's MSS Hubei State Security Department in Wuhan) for a ~14-year campaign against US and foreign critics, journalists, businesses and political officials, including members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. The same day the UK attributed the 2021-22 Electoral Commission breach and reconnaissance against parliamentarians to China and sanctioned two APT31 individuals plus Wuhan Xiaoruizhi. The same actor underpins later European attributions (e.g., Czechia 2025), making this an EU-relevant template. China rejected the charges. The hacking is illegal intrusion and transnational-repression-adjacent surveillance.

Documents from Chinese security contractor i-Soon, leaked to GitHub on 16 Feb 2024, listed Malaysia among targets of state-linked cyber-espionage, with staff chats boasting of access to Malaysian (and other) telecom providers and data extraction across some 20+ countries (India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea among them). Beijing's foreign ministry routinely denies state-sponsored hacking and did not confirm the leak. Separately, Symantec attributed an Aug 2024-Feb 2025 'Billbug/Lotus Panda' campaign against an unnamed Southeast Asian country's government ministry, telecoms operator and air-traffic-control body to a China-linked APT. State-directed intrusion into another country's networks is unlawful espionage and a core grey-zone tool.

Vietnam's National Cybersecurity Monitoring Center reported that China-linked Mustang Panda ran two large phishing campaigns in April and May 2024, impersonating educational bodies (Apr) and tax authorities (May) via malicious LNK files to target Vietnamese organisations. In 2023 Vietnam publicly named Chinese APT groups (APT31, APT41, Mustang Panda, SharpPanda) as espionage threats. China routinely denies state involvement in hacking; state-directed cyber-espionage is an illegal intrusion under most national laws.

From Oct–Nov 2020 China applied undeclared "verbal" bans and customs slow-walking — letting Beijing deny coercion. Coal alone was ~70% of the affected trade. Imports quietly resumed early 2023 after the change of Australian government.

Anti-dumping duties of 116.2–218.4% from Mar 2021 cut exports from ~A$1.24bn (2019) to under A$1m by 2023; removed 29 Mar 2024. The hardest-hit sector to recover.

China imposed 80.5% duties on Australian barley (28 May 2020), closing a >50% export market; Australia filed at the WTO then suspended the case for an expedited review. Duties removed 5 Aug 2023 — the first major de-escalation.

After Canberra's Apr 2020 call for a COVID-origins inquiry, China launched a trade-coercion campaign; in Nov 2020 a diplomat handed Australian media 14 grievances (Huawei ban, foreign-interference laws, "unfriendly" media). Punishment kept below the conflict threshold and never formally acknowledged as retaliation.

Live rock lobster effectively banned from late 2020 (exports −64% by 2021); final restrictions lifted 20 Dec 2024 — the last of the multi-year barriers, marking the formal end of the campaign on affected goods.

Measures hit ~A$20bn of exports but largely backfired: coal redirected to Japan/India, cotton to SE Asia, barley to the Middle East; China's share of Australian exports fell ~33%→27.6% (2020–22) with little aggregate GDP damage — the canonical case study in the limits of economic coercion.

Coercion has shifted from tariffs to chokepoints: Apr 2025 licensing controls on seven heavy rare earths (suspended to Nov 2026 after a Xi–Trump deal), and on 29 Jan 2026 China's ambassador warned of "countermeasures" if Canberra forces divestment of the Darwin Port lease. The one part of the picture trending up.

After Seoul agreed in 2016 to host the US THAAD missile-defence battery, Beijing imposed an informal but sweeping coercion campaign: a ban (effective ~15 March 2017) on Chinese group tours (Chinese arrivals collapsed, with 2017 down ~48% YoY); targeted shutdowns of retailer Lotte (which provided the deployment land) via 'fire-code' inspections that froze its ~US$2.6bn Shenyang project and shuttered ~75 of 99 Lotte Marts in China; and a Hallyu/K-pop content ban. The Hyundai Research Institute estimated a ~US$7.5bn loss for 2017 (~0.5% of GDP). Beijing officially denied any state-directed boycott, framing the measures as private consumer choice and market regulation. The acts are largely lawful-but-norm-breaking informal sanctions rather than formal trade-law violations.

On 6 Jan 2026, citing Takaichi's November 2025 Taiwan comments, China announced export controls barring dual-use items that could aid Japan's military capabilities — covering rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite, antimony, tungsten, magnets and advanced manufacturing/aerospace gear, effective immediately. Gallium and germanium exports to Japan fell to near zero in early 2026. CSIS assesses this as a notable shift toward explicitly tying critical-mineral access to the Taiwan issue; the controls are formally lawful trade measures but coercive in intent.

In March 2019 China suspended the import licences of Canada's two largest canola seed exporters, Richardson International and Viterra, citing alleged pest contamination. The move came months after Meng Wanzhou's arrest and was widely read as economic retaliation; Canadian canola seed exports to China fell from about C$2.8 billion in 2018 to about C$800 million in 2019. Canada launched a WTO challenge in September 2019; China reinstated market access for the two firms on 18 May 2022. Plausibly lawful on its face (SPS pretext) but norm-breaking as coercion; Beijing denied any link to the Meng case.

Beijing's State Council tariff commission ended ECFA preferential rates on 12 Taiwanese petrochemical products from Jan 2024 (announced Dec 2023, weeks before the 13 Jan presidential vote) and on 31 May 2024 announced suspension of concessions on 134 more items (petrochemicals, textiles, machinery, steel, transport equipment) from 15 Jun 2024 — less than two weeks after President Lai's 20 May inauguration. China justified it as a response to Taiwan's 'discriminatory' trade bans breaching ECFA; Taiwan's government called it economic coercion and political pressure. Within the cross-Strait deal, the suspension is arguably lawful-but-coercive in timing and intent.

On 3 Dec 2024 (MOFCOM Notice 2024 No. 46) China banned exports of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials specifically to the United States and tightened graphite checks, directly after new US chip export controls on 2 Dec 2024 - the first time such rules singled out the US. Estimates warned a Ga/Ge ban could cut US GDP by billions per year. China suspended the relevant clause on 9 Nov 2025 (until 27 Nov 2026) amid trade talks, though a prohibition on dual-use shipments to US military users/uses remained. Lawful as an export measure but explicitly weaponised against one country; Beijing frames it as legitimate national-security control.

On 22 June 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce added 10 US firms to its export-control list, barring dual-use exports to them with immediate effect and pointedly naming MP Materials and USA Rare Earth — the two flagship firms Washington has funded to break China's rare-earth dependence. Beijing framed the move as retaliation for the Pentagon's early-June addition of ~80 Chinese companies to its 1260H 'Chinese Military Companies' list; analysts noted it is calibrated and largely symbolic (both US firms say they had already cut Chinese equipment/materials), signalling Beijing can act selectively even while the broader Oct-2025 export-control suspension runs to 10 Nov 2026.

After PM Sanae Takaichi told the Diet on 7 Nov 2025 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a 'survival-threatening situation' permitting a Japanese military response, China suspended Japanese seafood imports on 19 Nov 2025 — re-imposing a ban only recently lifted (the original 2023 ban followed Fukushima treated-water releases). Beijing framed the move on Fukushima wastewater/safety grounds, but its timing and pairing with travel advisories and postponed cultural releases mark it as political economic coercion rather than a genuine food-safety measure.

China suspended Taiwanese pineapples (1 Mar 2021), then sugar/wax apples (Sep 2021) and grouper (Jun 2022), citing pests and chemical residues. The targeted goods were China-dependent — Beijing took ~90%+ of Taiwan's pineapple, sugar-apple, wax-apple and grouper exports — concentrating pain on southern farming/fishing communities. Taipei called the moves abrupt unilateral suspensions inconsistent with WTO/trade rules; Beijing maintained the bans were routine biosecurity. Phytosanitary measures are facially lawful but the pattern reads as targeted coercion.

China has been NZ's largest trading partner since 2017 and takes a large share of its exports, a dependency observers say has tempered Wellington's willingness to join allied criticism of Beijing; in April 2021 FM Nanaia Mahuta said NZ was 'uncomfortable with expanding the remit of Five Eyes' beyond intelligence matters, and in January 2021 Trade Minister Damien O'Connor urged Australia to 'follow us and show respect' to China during Beijing's coercion of Canberra. In June 2023 NZ joined Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US in a Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices (Paris, 8 Jun 2023). This is implicit leverage/posture rather than a specific documented sanction against NZ; China frames the relationship as mutually beneficial and rejects 'coercion' labels.

On 31 Aug 2020, Chinese State Councillor/FM Wang Yi warned that Czech Senate Speaker Milos Vystrcil would 'pay a heavy price' for his official Taiwan trip, calling it a 'public affront'/'open provocation' that 'crossed China's red line'; Vystrcil led an ~89-person delegation, addressed Taiwan's parliament ('I am Taiwanese') and met President Tsai Ing-wen on 3 Sep 2020. The threat capped a coercion campaign: a Chinese embassy letter to the Czech president's office (dated 10 Jan, reported Feb 2020) warned that Czech firms with China interests, naming VW unit Skoda Auto and lender Home Credit, 'will have to pay' over a planned Taiwan trip by then-Senate Speaker Jaroslav Kubera (who died before travelling); separately, from 2019 Beijing cancelled tours by Prague orchestras (incl. the Prague Philharmonic) over Mayor Zdenek Hrib's Taiwan/Tibet stance and Prague's Taipei sister-city switch. Beijing framed Vystrcil as interfering in China's internal affairs and breaching the one-China policy; Prague rejected the threats as interference in a sovereign country's affairs. The threats, business pressure and cancelled cultural exchanges are coercive and norm-breaking but lawful (not illegal under international law), prefiguring the harder economic-coercion template later applied to Lithuania in 2021.

Nine days after Canada's Dec 2018 arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou on a US extradition request, China detained Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor on espionage charges; all three were released within hours of each other in Sep 2021 (after 1,020 days), making the linkage explicit. Analysts treat it as a template case of 'hostage diplomacy' - detaining foreign nationals under colour of law as foreign-policy leverage. Beijing rejected any quid pro quo and insisted the men faced genuine criminal proceedings under Chinese law. Arbitrary detention as state leverage is illegal under international human-rights norms.

Around the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff China imposed tighter phytosanitary inspections on Philippine bananas (citing pests/mealy bugs), suspended exporter Sumifru's permit and left fruit to rot at the ports of Dalian, Shanghai and Xingang in early-mid 2012; Chinese travel agencies also curbed tours to the Philippines (Chinese tourism had grown ~77% in Q1 2012). China never formally acknowledged retaliation and framed the measures as routine quarantine, but the timing pointed to political coercion. This established a template - lawful-looking trade/health tools deployed coercively - later echoed in threats over the West Philippine Sea.

Beijing converted its dominance of critical-mineral processing into an export-control weapon: licensing on gallium/germanium (3 Jul 2023) and graphite (Oct 2023), licensing on antimony and superhard materials (Aug 2024), an outright in-principle ban on gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the US plus a ban on rare-earth processing technology (3 Dec 2024), and 7 medium/heavy rare earths plus magnets placed under global licensing in Apr 2025 in retaliation for US tariffs - briefly disrupting shipments worldwide including to Japan and Germany. China frames the measures as lawful dual-use export controls applied to all countries. Using a legal export-licensing regime as targeted geo-economic pressure is lawful-but-norm-breaking.

After Lithuania let Taiwan open a "Taiwanese Representative Office" in Vilnius in Nov 2021 (using "Taiwanese" rather than the customary "Taipei"), Beijing downgraded diplomatic ties and Lithuania disappeared from China's electronic customs system; Lithuanian exports to China fell ~91% year-on-year in Nov 2021, and the EU alleged China also pressured third-country firms to strip Lithuanian content from supply chains (an unprecedented secondary-sanctions tactic). China denies any official boycott, framing the disruption as Lithuania's own doing for violating the one-China principle. Lawful-but-norm-breaking: an informal, deniable trade restriction rather than a declared tariff.

On 3 Jul 2023 China's MOFCOM and Customs (GAC) announced export licensing controls on gallium and germanium items (effective 1 Aug 2023), calculated as a response to US/allied semiconductor controls. Export volumes collapsed within months (gallium from 6,876 kg in Jul to 227 kg by Oct 2023). The licensing regime is lawful under export-control norms but functions as targeted leverage over chip, defence and solar supply chains. China characterises the measures as legitimate national-security export controls, not coercion.

A diplomatic note from China's foreign ministry, sent to Malaysia's embassy in Beijing on 18 Feb 2024 and published in full by a Philippine news site on 29 Aug 2024, demanded Malaysia 'immediately' cease oil and gas exploration and production off Sarawak on the grounds the waters lie within China's claimed maritime zone. Malaysia's foreign ministry confirmed the note's authenticity, opened an internal probe and filed a police report over the leak; PM Anwar Ibrahim publicly refused to halt activity while striking a conciliatory tone. China maintains the area is within its nine-dash-line claim. The demand targets activity inside Malaysia's UNCLOS EEZ, making it coercive diplomacy against lawful economic activity.

On 4 Apr 2025 China's MOFCOM imposed licensing controls on seven medium/heavy rare-earth elements (terbium, dysprosium, samarium, gadolinium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium) plus related compounds, metals and magnets, in retaliation for new Trump 'Liberation Day' tariffs. Within weeks magnet exports to Japan and South Korea fell by ~91-93% and US/European/Japanese automakers reported supply disruptions; a second wave on 9 Oct 2025 added further elements and technologies. CSIS flagged direct risk to US defence supply chains. China defends the controls as lawful and tied to national security, not coercion.

Under Chinese pressure, in June 2017 Vietnam ordered Spain's Repsol to suspend drilling in Block 136-03 after Beijing reportedly threatened to attack Vietnamese-held Spratly outposts; in March 2018 Vietnam halted the adjacent Red Emperor / Ca Rong Do field (Block 07/03), with reporting the cancellation risked ~$200m in sunk costs on a roughly $1bn+ (reported up to $2bn) project. China rejects the legitimacy of Vietnamese blocks overlapping its 'nine-dash line.' Coercing a third-country firm out of Vietnam's EEZ via military and economic threats is norm-breaking.

From around November 2017 Beijing reminded Chinese travel agencies that Palau lacks Approved Destination Status (ADS) and threatened penalties (reportedly fines exceeding US$60,000) for continued group tours, effectively choking off package tourism to punish Palau for diplomatically recognising Taiwan (reportedly triggered by a 2017 Palau delegation visit to Taipei); reporting also indicates an October 2017 prohibition on using the word 'Palau' in Chinese sales/marketing materials. Chinese visitors had been roughly half of Palau's ~122,000 arrivals in 2017 (about 55,000), and visitor numbers fell sharply thereafter (a ~22.7% drop in Chinese visitors by end-2017 and continued declines into 2018), in an economy where tourism is over 40% of GDP. Taiwanese-owned Palau Pacific Airways collapsed, shutting down on 31 Aug 2018, after China bookings dropped ~50% and Beijing labelled Palau an 'illegal destination'. China's counter-framing: at a regular press conference on 23 November 2017 the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman formally denied that China had issued any ban on tours to Palau, though state outlet Global Times later reprinted Japanese reporting acknowledging package tours had been suspended since late 2017 over Taiwan-related disputes. The measure is lawful-but-norm-breaking: withholding ADS is within China's sovereign right, but weaponising it to coerce a third state's foreign-policy choices breaches norms against economic coercion. Palau declined Beijing's reported offer (per later 2024 reporting, to 'fill every hotel room') if it cut ties with Taipei and instead pivoted to other tourism markets.

Brunei is the 'silent claimant' to parts of the Spratlys (including Louisa Reef) and the only claimant maintaining no military presence; it rarely protests Chinese activity. Analysts link this restraint to deep economic dependence, including roughly US$6bn in Chinese investment in the Hengyi oil refinery (~$3.45bn) and related infrastructure, which has effectively muted Bandar Seri Begawan on the dispute. This is a softer form of coercion-via-inducement rather than illegal action: China secures diplomatic acquiescence through trade and investment leverage, weakening ASEAN unity. (Note: the 'abandons claim' framing is analyst interpretation, not a formal Brunei renunciation.)

After the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 2010 Peace Prize to jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo, Beijing froze high-level political contact and suspended free-trade talks, and Norwegian salmon was hit by extended veterinary quarantine, health-certificate, inspection and customs measures (introduced from Dec 2010). Norway's share of China's salmon imports fell from ~92% (2010) to ~29% (H1 2013) — roughly a 70% drop. The Kolstad CMI study estimates direct fish-export losses of ~USD 125-176m and total direct export losses of ~USD 780m-1.3bn for 2011-13; exports rebounded to normal levels by 2014. China framed the prize as interference in its internal affairs and officially denied the salmon barriers were political retaliation, attributing them to health/quarantine concerns (AQSIQ cited disease/virus worries) — making this a lawful-but-norm-breaking case of de facto coercion via discretionary non-tariff barriers rather than formal sanctions. Relations were normalised on 19 December 2016 after Norway issued a statement fully respecting China's sovereignty/territorial integrity and 'core interests' and pledging not to support actions undermining them — widely read as the foundational European case of Chinese economic coercion.

Following Galwan, India banned 59 apps with Chinese links - including TikTok, WeChat and UC Browser - on 29 June 2020 citing data-security and sovereignty concerns, then 118 more (including PUBG) in September 2020, with bans sustained into 2025. These are India's own measures rather than direct Chinese coercion, but are widely read as New Delhi targeting a Chinese economic 'soft underbelly' in response to PLA pressure on the LAC, illustrating spillover of the grey-zone contest into the economic-tech domain. Included for context with lower direct relevance to Chinese-initiated coercion; China protested the bans as discriminatory.

After the Chinese trawler Minjinyu 5179 rammed two Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkakus on 7 Sep 2010, Japan arrested the captain (Zhan Qixiong) on 8 Sep and detained him; Chinese customs reportedly halted rare-earth-element exports to Japan within days, until the captain's release on 24 Sep. China then controlled roughly 90-97% of global rare-earth supply (AMTI cites 97%) and Japan was acutely dependent for auto magnets and electronics; the episode is widely cited as the original critical-mineral coercion precedent. China's counter-framing: Beijing repeatedly denied any coercive intent or formal embargo, characterizing export reductions as a previously-announced, long-planned shift toward resource protection and 'sustainable development.' Later analyses of Japanese port/import data (e.g. Johnston 2013; CEPR/VoxEU) questioned whether a uniform embargo actually occurred, noting Japan had been aware since mid-Aug 2010 of planned worldwide Chinese cuts. Conduct was lawful-but-norm-breaking as an informal pressure tactic, though China's broader rare-earth export quotas/duties were later found WTO-illegal (DS431, panel 26 Mar 2014, Appellate Body 7 Aug 2014).

After Vilnius allowed a 'Taiwanese Representative Office' (Nov 2021), China downgraded ties, effectively deleted Lithuania from its customs origin system to block its goods (shipments fell ~91% year-on-year in Nov 2021), and pressured multinationals to drop Lithuanian components on pain of losing China-market access. The EU requested WTO dispute consultations in Jan 2022 (Australia, Taiwan, Canada, Japan, UK and US later joined as third parties) and accelerated its Anti-Coercion Instrument; the EU eventually wound down the WTO case after trade resumed. Beijing denied any official boycott, attributing disruptions to 'companies' decisions' and to Lithuania's breach of the One China principle. Informal, deniable trade coercion is lawful-but-norm-breaking and arguably WTO-inconsistent.

After the Dalai Lama's 18-21 Nov 2016 religious visit to Mongolia, China froze high-level diplomacy, postponed talks on a loan (widely reported as ~$4.2bn) Mongolia urgently needed amid recession, and from 1 Dec 2016 imposed new charges at the Gashuun Sukhait crossing: a 10-yuan (~$1.45) per-vehicle transit fee, an 8 yuan/tonne cargo fee, and a 0.2% surcharge on copper concentrate and precious metals valued above 10,000 yuan/tonne (CNBC/AFP; Tibetan Review). The crossing carries Mongolia's key exports, copper from Rio Tinto's Oyu Tolgoi mine and coal from Tavan Tolgoi. In early December, China also congested/closed a key crossing (Al Jazeera, 10 Dec 2016, named Gants Mod), stranding hundreds of trucks in sub-zero conditions. Under the pressure, FM Tsend Munkh-Orgil announced (Unuudur, ~21 Dec 2016) the Dalai Lama would not be permitted future visits even for religious purposes, and Ulaanbaatar expressed regret. China officially avoided confirming linkage: FM spokesman Geng Shuang said he was 'unaware' of the new fees while insisting Mongolia eliminate the 'negative effects' of the visit; in a 24 Jan 2017 call FM Wang Yi said he hoped Mongolia had 'taken this lesson to heart.' The measures were framed as ordinary customs charges, making them lawful-but-coercive rather than overtly illegal, though the de facto trade pressure and loan freeze were widely read as political retaliation over Tibet/sovereignty.

On 28 Feb 2024 Burgess declassified the "A-team," a foreign-intelligence cell disrupted in late 2023 that recruited a former (unnamed) Australian politician who "sold out their country." ASIO did not officially name the sponsoring state.

In his 2024 and 2025 Annual Threat Assessments, Burgess said espionage/foreign interference would sit at CERTAIN (highest on the scale) and named the PRC the most persistent threat, with AUKUS a priority target.

Melbourne businessman and former Victorian Liberal candidate found guilty 19 Dec 2023 of planning foreign interference (the first conviction under the 2018 laws) for cultivating a minister on the CCP's behalf while concealing United Front links.

Sydney executive arrested Apr 2023, the second charged under the laws, for compiling reports against an MSS "shopping list" touching AUKUS topics, for contacts who approached him via LinkedIn. Convicted of reckless foreign interference.

Hong Kong issued HK$1m bounties on exiled activists (2023–24), including Australian citizens Kevin Yam and Ted Hui; in Mar 2025 anonymous "bounty letters" were sent to Melbourne. ASIO's 2025 assessment said it had disrupted plots to physically harm critics in Australia.

The federal Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference led by Justice Marie-Josee Hogue concluded that overall election integrity held, but called foreign interference a 'stain' on Canada's electoral process: it found a 'well-grounded suspicion' the PRC was tied to the busing of voters in the 2019 Don Valley North Liberal nomination, and 'strong indications of PRC involvement' with a 'reasonable possibility' that disinformation narratives could have impacted the 2021 result in Steveston-Richmond East (where Conservative Kenny Chiu lost). Foreign interference in democratic processes is illegal under Canadian law; Beijing denies interfering and dismisses such findings as smears and Cold War thinking.

Intelligence assessments found a PRC Ministry of State Security officer sought information on Conservative MP Michael Chong's relatives in Hong Kong after he sponsored a Feb 2021 Commons motion declaring Beijing's treatment of Uyghurs a genocide. On 8 May 2023 Canada declared Toronto-based PRC diplomat Zhao Wei persona non grata for his alleged role; China retaliated by expelling a Canadian diplomat based in Shanghai. Beijing rejected the allegations as slander and defamation. Transnational intimidation of a legislator and his family is coercive interference.

During the 2021 federal campaign, PRC-linked WeChat accounts and Chinese-language state and social media spread disinformation against Hong Kong-born Conservative MP Kenny Chiu after he proposed a foreign-influence registry, falsely framing the bill as anti-Chinese-community legislation. Chiu lost Steveston-Richmond East; the Atlantic Council's DFRLab documented the WeChat campaign, and the Hogue inquiry found a 'reasonable possibility' the interference contributed to his defeat. Beijing denies interference. Covert targeting of a candidate via diaspora platforms is election interference.

Researchers have documented recurring China-origin influence operations targeting Philippine politics and the maritime dispute. ASPI assessed a coordinated X/YouTube network 'very likely' linked to the Chinese government amplified a debunked deepfake of Marcos appearing to take drugs (the 'polvoron' video) hours before his 22 Jul 2024 SONA. From late 2024-mid 2025 PCIJ/PressOne.PH tracked 200+ accounts (many with Chinese names, including ~107 repurposed Spanish-language accounts) smearing Marcos and boosting VP Sara Duterte; narratives also attack the 2016 arbitral ruling. (An earlier Meta takedown of 155 China-originated accounts targeting Philippine politics and the West Philippine Sea occurred in Sep 2020, not in this window.) China denies running disinformation; these covert inauthentic operations breach platform and information-integrity norms.

A federal jury in Brooklyn convicted U.S. citizen Lu ('Harry') Lu Jianwang of acting as an unregistered agent of China for helping establish a clandestine PRC 'police' outpost in Manhattan's Chinatown that the FBI raided in October 2022; prosecutors said his recovered WeChat messages showed he was 'in lockstep' with Chinese government taskings. His defence countered that it was a 'paperwork' case limited to helping diaspora members renew Chinese driver's licences, not espionage; Beijing has previously dismissed such overseas 'police station' allegations as fabrications.

The CCP-linked influence operation Spamouflage (aka Dragonbridge; overlapping with activity Microsoft tracks as Storm-1376/Taizi Flood) escalated ahead of the 2024 US election, using fake US-voter personas across X, TikTok and 40+ platforms/websites to amplify divisive content (guns, race, homelessness, Gaza) and cast doubt on electoral legitimacy, increasingly with AI-generated material targeting Biden, Trump and Harris. Microsoft (Oct 2024), NPR/research firms (Sep 2024) and OpenAI documented the activity. Covert foreign-influence operations breach platform rules and US norms; China denies running influence campaigns and rejects the attribution.

Global Affairs Canada's Rapid Response Mechanism reported on 23 October 2023 that a China-linked 'Spamouflage' bot network ran an August-September 2023 campaign, leaving thousands of comments in English and French across the social-media accounts of dozens of MPs including PM Justin Trudeau and Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre, to discredit critics of the CCP. The network has been publicly tied to China by researchers and platforms. Beijing denies state involvement. Covert inauthentic influence operations breach platform rules and democratic norms.

NZ's security agency identifies the PRC as an active foreign-interference actor in NZ. The NZSIS 2025 Security Threat Environment report describes the United Front Work Department's activities as 'regularly deceptive, coercive and corruptive', and warns of co-option of diaspora communities, including potentially refugees and community members, for the PRC's purposes. Earlier RFA reporting (19 Aug 2023) described PRC-aligned pressure — cash, diplomatic pressure and advertising boycotts — muting independent NZ Chinese-language media in favour of Beijing-friendly outlets. Covert co-option and surveillance of a diaspora community on behalf of a foreign state would constitute illegal foreign interference/repression; China denies conducting transnational repression.

Reporting from 2017 onward documented PRC United Front influence in NZ politics: National MP Jian Yang did not disclose, on his immigration/residency application or CVs, time spent at PLA-linked military-intelligence language institutes (incl. the Luoyang language institute); and businessman Zhang Yikun (Hainan-linked, awarded a NZ Order of Merit in 2018) featured in a National Party donation case — he was later convicted over a 2018 donation in the SFO 'National Party donations' fraud trial. Academic Anne-Marie Brady's 'Magic Weapons' (2017) framed this as a coordinated influence system. These activities sit in a grey area between lawful lobbying/diaspora engagement and covert foreign interference; China rejects the 'United Front interference' framing as Cold War-style smearing of normal people-to-people ties.

Ahead of the 13 Jan 2024 election, monitors recorded a PRC-aligned information-manipulation surge — Doublethink Lab logged over 10,000 suspicious posts echoing CCP narratives, including generative-AI content used to mask coordinated inauthentic behavior, fabricated material (e.g., a false ebook smearing President Tsai), and narratives attacking US ties and DPP candidates. Researchers (MERICS, Doublethink Lab) attribute the campaign to PRC cognitive-warfare efforts; Beijing denies orchestrating interference. Covert foreign influence in another state's election is norm-breaking and, where it involves fabricated content/inauthentic networks, often illegal under Taiwan law.

Following Japan's Aug 2023 release of treated Fukushima water, reporting (CNN, Al Jazeera, China Digital Times) documented a coordinated Chinese state-media/online campaign spreading disinformation about the release's safety — fuelling panic salt-hoarding — alongside thousands of harassing calls from Chinese numbers flooding Japanese government offices and businesses, prompting Tokyo to summon China's ambassador on 28 Aug 2023. Beijing rejected the disinformation framing. Messaging is lawful; the coordinated state amplification and tolerated harassment constitute norm-breaking interference.

University of Canterbury professor Anne-Marie Brady, a leading scholar of CCP influence operations, reported a 14 February 2018 home burglary in which intruders took electronic devices used to research her 'Magic Weapons' paper (laptops and a phone) while ignoring jewellery and cash left in the open, alongside an earlier break-in, a threatening letter and apparent tampering with her car, which she described as a psychological operation to intimidate her. NZ Police (incl. the National Security Investigation Team), the SIS and Interpol investigated but reached no resolution; academics and rights groups signed open letters urging the NZ government to protect her. No state actor was conclusively identified, so attribution to China remains an inference (transnational-repression pattern). China made no specific public response and denies running such operations.

In November 2023 (announced ~13 Nov) South Korea's National Intelligence Service, with private cybersecurity firms, identified 38 fake Korean-language news websites linked to Chinese PR firms Haimai and Haixun. The sites mimicked legitimate outlets (e.g. 'Busan Online,' 'Daegu Journal,' 'Chungcheong Times') and posed as members of the Korea Digital News Association, pushing pro-China, anti-US and anti-Japan content—disparaging Seoul's role in the US-led Summit for Democracy and praising China's COVID response—often republishing real Korean articles without consent. Beijing denied involvement and said it opposes disinformation; the operation echoes the Citizen Lab-documented 'PAPERWALL'/Haixun network across 30+ countries.

On 13 Jan 2022 MI5 issued a rare public 'Interference Alert' to Parliament naming solicitor Christine Lee as knowingly engaged in political interference on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD), having facilitated financial donations on behalf of foreign nationals in China/Hong Kong. Labour MP Barry Gardiner was the principal recipient (reported at c.£400k-£600k over several years across outlets); Lee's son Daniel Wilkes worked in Gardiner's parliamentary office as his diary manager. Lee challenged the alert as unlawful (including a racial-discrimination claim), but on 17 Dec 2024 the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (Lord Justice Singh, Lord Boyd of Duncansby and Judge Rupert Jones) unanimously dismissed her claims, ruling MI5 had 'legitimate reasons' and that the alert was a 'proportionate response to the threat posed' and 'necessary in a democratic society.' China's Foreign Ministry rejected the spy/agent label; in Jan 2022 spokesperson Wang Wenbin said critics had 'watched too many 007 movies, leading to unnecessary mental associations,' and Beijing dismissed the allegations as alarmist 'China threat' hyping, denying any interference. The influence-buying sat in a lawful-but-norm-breaking grey zone (covert foreign-linked political donations and access cultivation) rather than a prosecuted crime: no criminal charges were brought against Lee, and MI5 itself said none of the money came from an illegal source.

During South Korea's 3 June 2025 presidential race, AI deepfakes and false claims (e.g. that Chinese nationals exploited overseas-voter registration to cast fraudulent ballots) circulated widely; ex-president Yoon Suk-yeol had partly justified his December 2024 martial-law declaration on alleged election fraud/Chinese meddling. Beijing's Seoul embassy denied interference, and USFK had earlier rejected as 'entirely false' the claim that the US captured ~100 Chinese election-rigging spies; the White House (3 Jun 2025) called the vote free and fair while separately voicing generic concern about Chinese influence in democracies. Analysts warn the 'Chinese interference' theme has itself become a domestic disinformation/politicisation vector, and the headline 2025 fraud allegations are largely unsubstantiated—flagged here to avoid overstating attribution.

Jian Guo, a German citizen and aide to AfD MEP Maximilian Krah, was arrested in Apr 2024 and convicted by the Dresden Higher Regional Court (sentenced to 4 years 9 months, Sept 2025) of passing hundreds of documents — including files on European Parliament proceedings — to Chinese intelligence between Sept 2019 and Apr 2024, and of surveilling Chinese dissidents in Germany. The case is an illegal espionage/foreign-interference penetration of an EU institution; China dismisses such cases as politicised.

A Dec 2023 joint investigation by the Financial Times, Der Spiegel and Le Monde, based on intercepted messages from 2019 to late 2022, reported that an MSS officer ("Daniel Woo") directed former Belgian senator Frank Creyelman to shape European debate on Hong Kong and the Uyghurs — including attacking researcher Adrian Zenz — with the stated aim to "divide the US-EU relationship"; he was reportedly paid up to EUR 10,000 in cryptocurrency per assignment. Creyelman was expelled from Vlaams Belang. China did not substantively rebut the specifics. Covert foreign-agent influence operations breach espionage and foreign-interference laws.

On 13 Mar 2025 Belgian prosecutors detained several people and raided 21 premises in Belgium and Portugal; eight people were ultimately charged with corruption, money laundering and criminal-organisation offences over alleged bribery of MEPs benefiting China's Huawei (gifts, travel, football tickets and payments to sway parliamentary positions) said to have run discreetly since 2021. Several MEPs' immunities were challenged. Huawei denied wrongdoing and pledged zero tolerance. If proven, the conduct is illegal corruption used as a covert influence lever rather than mere lobbying.

Spamouflage (tracked by Google as Dragonbridge), running since ~2017 and linked by Meta to individuals associated with Chinese law enforcement, floods platforms with pro-CCP content and harasses dissidents and journalists. On 29 Aug 2023 Meta announced its largest-ever single takedown - 7,704 Facebook accounts, 954 pages, 15 groups and 15 Instagram accounts - and the operation has since impersonated Americans and targeted US, Taiwanese and Canadian politics. China denies running state disinformation and dismisses the attribution as Western 'smearing'. Covert inauthentic influence operations are lawful-but-norm-breaking, crossing into illegality where they involve impersonation or election interference.

ASPI's Strategist (28 Nov 2024), drawing on Meta disclosures and a joint Doublethink Lab investigation, documented China-linked inauthentic networks on platforms including Facebook, X and YouTube amplifying the Manipur ethnic conflict and pushing narratives such as 'Manipur has never been a part of India' and that 'India is running concentration camps for minorities,' targeting Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh through and after the 2024 Indian elections. Meta disclosed at least two China-origin coordinated networks targeting India since 2023. Covert foreign manipulation of domestic politics is norm-breaking interference; Beijing denies involvement.

A PRC-linked inauthentic-account network using AI deepfakes to harass Australia-connected critics and push pro-CCP narratives; ASPI's Mar 2025 report geolocated operators to the Yancheng Public Security Bureau, Jiangsu.

A November 2025 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission accused China of running a disinformation campaign after India's May 2025 'Operation Sindoor' clash with Pakistan, using fake social-media accounts to spread AI-generated images of supposed downed-aircraft debris to depress sales of the French Rafale and promote China's J-35, while amplifying the performance of Chinese-made Pakistani systems (reportedly including pressure on Indonesia over its Rafale purchase). China's foreign ministry rejected the report; Pakistan welcomed it. Covert AI-amplified narrative-laundering tied to arms-market competition is a below-threshold information-operations play.

Landbridge's 99-year lease (2015) over the strategically located port; the 2025 government committed to returning it to Australian ownership using FATA/SOCI powers. China warned against it; analysts flag the risk Landbridge invokes the China–Australia BIT/ChAFTA for an investor-state claim — lawfare leveraging Australia's own treaties.

China maintains "non-acceptance, non-recognition" of the 12 Jul 2016 Hague award against its nine-dash-line claims; Australia formally rejected China's SCS maritime claims as inconsistent with UNCLOS in a Jul 2020 UN Note Verbale. Sustained legal erosion of the maritime order Australia depends on.

Former diplomat Michael Kovrig and businessman Michael Spavor were detained in China in December 2018, within days of Canada's arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou on a US extradition request. Held nearly three years (over 1,000 days) on espionage charges widely seen as retaliatory leverage, they were released on 24 September 2021 hours after Meng struck a deferred-prosecution deal and flew home. China denies the cases were linked or that it practises 'hostage diplomacy'; the detentions and opaque trials are widely characterised as arbitrary and contrary to international norms.

Spain-based NGO Safeguard Defenders reported in 2022 ('110 Overseas') that PRC public-security bureaus operated unofficial 'police service stations' abroad, including locations in the Greater Toronto Area, Vancouver and later the Montreal area. The RCMP confirmed investigations into the alleged stations and said its overt presence led several to cease operations; the stations are alleged to pressure diaspora targets to return to China. Beijing says they are volunteer-run admin centres not involved in criminal activity and accuses Canada of smearing it. Operating foreign police functions without consent breaches sovereignty and Canadian law.

In February 2025 Cook Islands PM Mark Brown signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Action Plan 2025-2030 with China (covering trade, seabed/deep-sea minerals, infrastructure, climate) during a visit to China, with the signing in Harbin (Heilongjiang) rather than Beijing, and without first sharing the text with Wellington. The Cook Islands is self-governing in free association with NZ, whose framework calls for consultation on foreign-policy and security matters, so NZ FM Winston Peters treated the lack of consultation as a breach of trust. In June 2025 NZ paused NZ$18.2m in core funding, later extended toward roughly NZ$29.8m. Brown argued the deal did not touch defence or foreign affairs; the dispute was eased by a later bilateral defence and security declaration.

Beyond the Cook Islands deal, Beijing has expanded security and economic engagement across the South Pacific (e.g. its April 2022 Solomon Islands security pact, a failed bid for a region-wide multilateral security/trade agreement in May 2022, and subsequent bilateral pacts), pressuring the posture of NZ and Australia as traditional 'partners of choice' in their near region. NZ officials and the NZSIS have flagged strategic competition in the Pacific as a growing concern. These are largely lawful bilateral agreements (norm-breaking in that they erode established consultative arrangements and transparency), and China characterises them as normal South-South cooperation that Western powers have no right to veto.

On 21 Jun 2024 China's Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate and the public-security, state-security and justice ministries jointly issued guidelines allowing criminal prosecution — including the death penalty and trials in absentia — of 'diehard' Taiwan-independence 'ringleaders' under the Anti-Secession Law, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law. Beijing presented it as lawful domestic criminal procedure; Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and rights groups (HRW) called it extraterritorial intimidation with no jurisdiction over Taiwan's residents — lawfare/coercion that Taipei rejects as having any binding force.

CSIS AMTI AIS analysis shows CCG patrols concentrating on Scarborough: ~376 ship-days in 2023, 516 in 2024 and 1,099 in 2025 (presence observed on 352 of 365 days, daily average ~3 CCG ships). China has repeatedly installed floating barriers across the lagoon entrance (a ~300m barrier in Sep 2023 removed by a PCG diver; further barriers since) and in Sep 2025 declared the feature a 'national nature reserve.' The persistent armed-coast-guard presence and barriers are a lawful-looking but coercive effort to consolidate administrative control over a feature the 2016 arbitral award found lies in the Philippine EEZ.

Seoul argues China's fixed structures inside the PMZ breach the 2001 Korea-China Fisheries Agreement, which was meant to defer competing EEZ claims and prohibits permanent installations in the jointly managed zone; analysts compare the salami-slicing playbook to South China Sea tactics ('fish farms or footholds'). Since 2018 China has unilaterally deployed at least 13 buoys plus the two Shen Lan cages and the management platform without prior consultation. Beijing denies any treaty breach, characterising the platforms as lawful civilian fisheries activity. This is contested-but-arguably-norm-breaking grey-zone lawfare rather than a clear-cut illegality.

On 17 Apr 2023 DOJ announced the arrests of Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping for operating an undeclared PRC Ministry of Public Security 'police station' in Manhattan's Chinatown to monitor and intimidate dissidents; on 18 Apr 2023 DOJ unveiled charges against ~40 Chinese officials across three cases (including 34 MPS officers of the '912 Special Project Working Group' running troll-farm harassment, plus an expanded Zoom case). Operating a foreign security outpost and coercing residents on US soil is illegal (acting as an unregistered foreign agent, obstruction). Beijing denies the sites are police stations, calling them volunteer 'service centres.'

In July 2023 China's Ministry of Natural Resources vessel Xiangyanghong 22 placed a ~10m ocean-observation buoy ('QF212') inside Japan's EEZ about 80km NW of Uotsuri (Senkakus), transmitting oceanographic data. Tokyo repeatedly protested and demanded removal; the buoy was confirmed removed on 11-12 Feb 2025, with Beijing characterising it as having 'completed its task.' China disputes the EEZ as Japan's and frames the buoy as legitimate scientific activity — a lawful-looking act used to assert jurisdiction and normalise presence in contested waters. (The further-buoy detail near Okinotorishima/Yonaguni is less firmly corroborated and not relied upon here.)

Freedom House's longitudinal dataset names China the single most prolific state perpetrator of transnational repression, attributing 272 incidents (about 22%) of all recorded physical cases over 2014-2024; in 2024 23 governments committed 160 physical incidents across 34 countries (China among the top perpetrators alongside Uganda, Cambodia, Russia and Iran), via abductions, assaults, detentions and unlawful deportations of exiles. Beijing denies targeting dissidents abroad and frames the activity as legitimate pursuit of 'fugitives' and 'criminals'. Extraterritorial coercion of this kind is illegal, violating host-state jurisdiction and individual rights.

On 14 Feb 2025 the Cook Islands (in free association with NZ) signed a 2025–2030 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership plus a five-year seabed-minerals MOU; NZ said it was not consulted. Signals great-power competition over Pacific critical minerals.

CSIS ChinaPower (16 May 2024) documented satellite imagery of upgraded dual-use 'xiaokang' (well-off) villages and military infrastructure at four locations near Arunachal - Zhuangnan, Majiduncun, Yarao (also Yarap) and Kuiqiongmen - including barracks, helipads, comms towers and likely military vehicles, with expansion observed 2022-2024. Under China's 2022 Land Borders Law these settle civilian populations to bolster sovereignty claims while embedding military infrastructure ('military-civil fusion'). India treats Arunachal as integral; China frames the building as domestic development on its own territory.

Beyond Solomons, Ministry of Public Security advisers were operating by 2024–25 in Kiribati (Tarawa from Jul 2023), with training in Fiji and Vanuatu and PRC funding for Samoa's first police academy — embedding PRC internal-security practice 3,000–4,000km from Australia.

China–Solomon Islands framework security agreement (Apr 2022; the leaked draft permitted PRC police, armed personnel and naval replenishment), upgraded to a police-cooperation pact (Jul 2023); Chinese police advisers and equipment deployed; cooperation continued under PM Manele post-2024. Texts never fully published.

A draft of the China-Solomon Islands security cooperation agreement leaked online in late March 2022; the framework was initialed around 30 March, and China confirmed the formal signing on 14 April 2022 (FM Wang Yi and Solomons FM Jeremiah Manele), reiterated on 19 April. The leaked draft permits the Solomons to request Chinese police, armed police and military personnel to maintain social order, allows PRC naval ships to make port calls and replenish, and includes a confidentiality clause. The negotiation was secretive and the final text was never published, raising concern about a potential PRC naval foothold less than 2,000km off Australia's northeast coast. Beijing and PM Sogavare both denied any intention to build a military base; China framed the pact as normal, sovereign, equal cooperation and accused Australia/US of a 'Cold War mentality' and treating Pacific states as their 'backyard.' The pact is a lawful sovereign agreement (norm-breaking on transparency, not illegal) but its secrecy and strategic reach alarmed Australia, the US, Japan and NZ.

In Jan 2022 the EU requested WTO consultations over China's restrictions on Lithuanian goods (DS610), with Australia, Canada, Japan, Taiwan, the UK and US joining as third parties; the panel proceedings stalled and the EU formally dropped the case on 28 Nov 2025, stating trade had "resumed" to near pre-dispute levels. The episode directly motivated the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument (Reg. 2023/2675, in force 27 Dec 2023), a deterrent that as of mid-2026 has never been formally triggered. China rejected the WTO complaint as groundless. The Lithuania measures are widely assessed as norm-breaking economic coercion; the abandoned case left their WTO-legality untested.

Safeguard Defenders documented Chinese "overseas police service stations": the '110 Overseas' report (12 Sep 2022) identified 54 stations and alleged 230,000 people 'persuaded to return'; the follow-up 'Patrol and Persuade' (5 Dec 2022) raised the total to at least 102 stations across 53 countries. Nominally for anti-fraud paperwork, they are used to pressure dissidents abroad to return to China via threats to family, harassment and in some cases coercion. Over a dozen governments opened investigations. Beijing insists the stations are voluntary administrative-service centres run by overseas Chinese, not police outposts, and denies any law-enforcement function abroad. Operating covert state agents on foreign soil is illegal under host-state sovereignty, not merely norm-breaking.

China's Ministry of Civil Affairs has repeatedly issued 'standardised' Mandarin/Tibetan names for locations in India's Arunachal Pradesh - 6 places (Apr 2017, after the Dalai Lama's visit), 15 (Dec 2021), 11 (Apr 2023), 30 (Mar 2024) and 27 (2025), totalling roughly 89 - asserting the region is 'Zangnan' (South Tibet). India's MEA rejects each list as a 'vain and preposterous' attempt that cannot alter ground realities; China says the naming is within its 'sovereign rights'. The renaming is lawful-on-its-face administrative action weaponised as cartographic aggression to manufacture a sovereignty record over territory India administers.

Researchers (CIS "State Capture," Feb 2023) documented China paying funds into the PM's discretionary account from 2019, reportedly divided among 39 of 50 MPs, coinciding with the Taiwan-to-PRC switch. A documented allegation, not a court finding.

China formally circulated its 'nine-dash line' map at the UN on 7 May 2009 (note verbale CML/17/2009, alongside CML/18/2009) to object to a Vietnam-Malaysia joint outer-continental-shelf submission to the CLCS. On 12 July 2016 a UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal (administered by the PCA), in a case brought by the Philippines, ruled China's claimed 'historic rights' within the nine-dash line had no legal basis under UNCLOS; Beijing boycotted the proceedings, rejected the tribunal's jurisdiction and declared the binding award 'null and void' and 'a piece of waste paper,' and has continued to assert the line. On 28 August 2023 China's Ministry of Natural Resources issued its 'Standard Map Edition 2023' showing a 'ten-dash line' (adding a tenth dash east of Taiwan), drawing formal protests from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and India. China counter-frames this as long-standing sovereignty and 'historic rights' and rejects the tribunal's authority, calling map publication a routine exercise of sovereignty. Defying a final, binding award and asserting maritime zones with no UNCLOS basis is treated by most states as unlawful, whereas issuing a 'standard map' is itself a lawful act being used as norm-breaking lawfare.

On 1 March 2024 China's Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs published new straight baselines in the Gulf of Tonkin; analysts assessed them as excessive (encroaching, at some points, ~50nm into international waters per a conservative UNCLOS reading), and on 14 March Vietnam urged Beijing to respect international law and the 2000 bilateral delimitation agreement. Vietnam responded with its own Gulf of Tonkin baseline declaration (21 Feb 2025, lodged with the UN), and China held live-fire drills in the gulf in late February 2025. China frames its baselines as a sovereign UNCLOS right; critics call them a lawfare move stretching maritime entitlements.

Unable to service China-financed loans on the underused Hambantota port, Sri Lanka leased it for 99 years to state-linked China Merchants Port Holdings for about USD 1.12bn - CMPort took an 85% stake in the operating company (HIPG), ~70% of total equity (deal signed Jul 2017, port formally handed over Dec 2017) - the template often cited as 'debt-trap diplomacy' for strategic dual-use port access on a key Indian Ocean sea lane. Beijing and several scholars dispute the 'debt-trap' framing, noting the lease cash went to foreign reserves rather than to retire the original construction debt and that the deal was commercially negotiated. The transaction itself is lawful; the strategic leverage and basing concern is the contested norm.

On 16 Sept 2019 the Solomon Islands cabinet (after a 27-0 coalition vote, six abstentions) decided to drop Taiwan for China; Taiwan's FM Joseph Wu announced immediate termination of the 36-year relationship the same day. Four days later, on 20 Sept 2019, Kiribati did the same, leaving Taiwan with just 15 diplomatic allies in the 'second defection in a week.' Reports (which Wu said were 'consistent with the information we obtained') put China's offer to Solomon Islands at roughly US$500 million; the switch was timed before the PRC's 70th-anniversary celebrations on 1 Oct 2019, part of a sustained campaign that earlier flipped Panama (2017), the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Burkina Faso (2018). Switching recognition is a lawful sovereign choice under international law, but Taipei condemned China's 'financial and political pressure' and refused 'dollar diplomacy' to match the inducements; the coordinated timing and checkbook inducements are the norm-eroding element. China's counter-framing: it welcomed the countries on the basis of the one-China principle and (via FM spokesperson Hua Chunying) called the moves part of 'the irresistible trend of the times,' casting them as voluntary sovereign decisions, not coercion.

China approved the world's largest hydropower project on the lower Yarlung Tsangpo in Medog County, Tibet on 25 December 2024; the ~60 GW (60,000 MW) scheme - roughly three times the Three Gorges Dam - sits on the upper Brahmaputra, which sustains a large downstream population in India and Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh raised water-security and ecological objections to unilateral construction and Beijing's refusal to share full hydrological data; China defends the project as clean energy with no significant downstream harm. Building on a shared transboundary river without a water-sharing treaty is lawful-but-norm-breaking upstream leverage.