China Threat Tracker
Tracking People's Liberation Army expansion, Pacific strategic presence, and the capability trajectory that defines Australia's strategic problem. Data from Pentagon annual reports, IISS Military Balance, and SIPRI.
The naval race, 1990–2050
Press play. One dot = one ship — watch the PLAN go from a coastal force to the world's largest navy while the RAN stays flat.
Solid dots = sourced or within ONI's 2035 horizon; hollowdots = extrapolated trend, 2036–2050 (no official projection). PLAN battle-force ships: US ONI projects 395 / 435 / 475 for 2025 / 2030 / 2035; pre-2015 approximate; 2036–2050 a decelerating trend. USN battle force fell from ~570 (1990) to ~295 today; future per CBO/Navy plans (uncertain). RAN major surface combatants have held ~10–13 since 1990; 2030+ reflects the 2024 Surface Fleet Review plan (toward 26 by 2040, funding uncertain). Different navies count differently — the trajectory is the point. Sources: US ONI (2020); Pentagon China Military Power Reports; CRS (O'Rourke); IISS; US Navy / CBO; Australian Surface Fleet Review 2024.
Today, to scale — all three navies
One dot = one ship. The PLAN, the US Navy, and the RAN as they stand now.
Navies count differently — the PLAN and USN figures are total “battle-force” ships; the RAN's front-line strength is its 11 major surface combatants (set to grow to 26 by 2040). However you count it, the scale gap is structural. Sources: Pentagon China Military Power Report / US ONI (PLAN, 370+); US Navy / USNI News (USN, 295, Dec 2024); Australian Government Surface Fleet Review 2024 (RAN, 11).
PLA Force Structure
Sources: Pentagon CMP Report 2024, IISS Military Balance 2025Navy
Air Force
Missiles
Nuclear
Spending
Personnel
The Peaking Power Thesis
China's military capability will peak approximately 2032-2035, then plateau and gradually decline as demographic and economic pressures bite. The working-age population peaked in 2011. The property sector collapse has destroyed ~30% of household wealth. The debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 280%. Military capability will continue expanding for another decade but the underlying drivers of national power are deteriorating.
The implication: The 2026-2035 window is the maximum danger period. A declining power with expanding military capability and domestic problems is the most dangerous kind. Australia must be prepared by 2032 or it risks confronting China at peak capability with inadequate defences.
Pacific Strategic Presence
Pillar 8: Northern ArcSolomon Islands
high riskSecurity agreement signed April 2022. Chinese police deployed. Potential naval access provisions. Wharf upgrades. Australia's closest neighbour in the arc.
Kiribati
high riskPresident Maamau aligned with Beijing since 2019 recognition switch. IPA Kanton Island airstrip of potential dual use. Withdrew from Pacific Islands Forum 2022.
Papua New Guinea
low riskAustralia's most important Pacific partner. Resisted Chinese security advances. Manus Island strategic significance. US Marines access secured 2023.
Vanuatu
medium riskBRI infrastructure. Luganville port dual-use concerns raised by Australian intelligence. Significant Chinese diaspora business community.
Tonga
medium riskChinese debt pressure from BRI infrastructure loans. Undersea cable contract with Chinese firm. Riots 2021 targeted Chinese businesses.
Tuvalu
medium riskTuvalu-Australia Falepili Union signed 2023 — Australia guarantees sovereignty, Tuvalu grants exclusive strategic partnership. Model for Pacific Compact.
Grey Zone Activities
China's coercion below the threshold of armed conflict — maritime & air incursions, cyber, economic coercion, disinformation, and Pacific/lawfare. 166 sourced activities across Australia and its allies — the template Australia faces, and the live half of the threat.