Threat Intelligence

China Threat Tracker

Tracking People's Liberation Army expansion, Pacific strategic presence, and the capability trajectory that defines Australia's strategic problem. Data from Pentagon annual reports, IISS Military Balance, and SIPRI.

PLA Navy Hulls

370+

+~20/yr

Nuclear Warheads (est.)

~600

Target: 1,500 by 2035

Official Defence Budget

~US$230B

Est. actual: US$350B+

Years to Peak Capability

Demographics bite post-2032

PLA Force Structure

Sources: Pentagon CMP Report 2024, IISS Military Balance 2025

Navy

Type 052D Destroyers

25+

6,000-tonne guided missile destroyers. Chinese equivalent of Arleigh Burke.

IISS Military Balance 2025

Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN)

Type 093 Shang-class. Noisy by Western standards but improving. 2nd-gen Type 095 in development.

Pentagon China Military Power Report 2024

Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

Jin-class with JL-2/JL-3 SLBMs. Range covers Australia from South China Sea.

Pentagon China Military Power Report 2024

Total Hull Count

370+

World's largest navy by hull count (~70% launched after 2010). US ONI projects 435 by 2030 and 475 by 2035. Grew from ~271 ships in 2016.

Pentagon CMP / US ONI

Aircraft Carriers (operational)

Liaoning & Shandong (STOBAR); Fujian — electromagnetic catapults (EMALS), commissioned Nov 2025, launched a J-35 by catapult. Only the US otherwise fields EMALS. 4th under construction.

Pentagon CMP / open source

Type 055 Destroyers

13,000-tonne cruiser-destroyer, 112 VLS cells with hypersonic anti-ship missiles. A second batch of 8 is under construction.

IISS Military Balance / open source

Air Force

J-20 Stealth Fighters

300+

Over 300 built by late 2025 at 100-120/year — roughly 3x the rate the US acquires F-35s. Twin-seat variant for manned-unmanned (drone) teaming. Two 6th-gen prototypes flying since late 2024.

Pentagon CMP / open source

H-6K/N Bombers

~200

Strategic bomber fleet. H-6K range covers Australia. H-6N air-refuelable.

IISS Military Balance 2025

Missiles

YJ-12/YJ-18 Anti-Ship Missiles

1,000s

Ship, submarine, and air-launched. YJ-12 Mach 2+ supersonic.

IISS Military Balance 2025

DF-26 IRBM ('Guam Killer')

250-400 launchers

Range ~4,000km — reaches US bases across the western Pacific including Guam (~3,000km). Covers northern Australia (Darwin) but NOT the whole continent — the DF-41 ICBM ranges all of Australia. ~250-400 launchers across 7+ brigades. Nuclear and conventional variants.

Pentagon CMP / CSIS

DF-41 ICBM

~30-40

14,000km range. Road-mobile ICBM. Covers the entire globe.

Pentagon China Military Power Report 2024

Nuclear

Nuclear Warheads (estimate)

~600

Tripled from ~200 (2020) to ~600 (mid-2024). Pentagon projects 1,000+ by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — fastest expansion of any nuclear state. Three new ICBM silo fields (Yumen, Hami, Yulin), ~320 silos. Moving toward launch-on-warning.

Pentagon CMP

Spending

Estimated Actual Defence Spend

~US$350B+

Standard methodology: 1.7x official figure to account for off-budget programmes.

Pentagon/SIPRI estimates

Official Defence Budget

~US$230B

Official figure. Actual spending estimated at 1.5-1.7x official (excludes paramilitaries, research, space).

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2024

Personnel

Active Military Personnel

2,000,000

World's largest standing army. PLA Army: 975,000. PLAN: 260,000. PLAAF: 395,000.

IISS Military Balance 2025

The Peaking Power Thesis

China's military capability will peak approximately 2032-2035, then plateau and gradually decline as demographic and economic pressures bite. The working-age population peaked in 2011. The property sector collapse has destroyed ~30% of household wealth. The debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 280%. Military capability will continue expanding for another decade but the underlying drivers of national power are deteriorating.

Working-age population peak

2011 (passed)

GDP growth forecast 2025-30

3-4% (declining)

Total debt / GDP

~285%

Youth unemployment peak (2023)

21%+

Property sector (% of economy)

~25% (collapsing)

Military capability peak (est.)

~2032-2035

The implication: The 2026-2035 window is the maximum danger period. A declining power with expanding military capability and domestic problems is the most dangerous kind. Australia must be prepared by 2032 or it risks confronting China at peak capability with inadequate defences.

Pacific Strategic Presence

Pillar 8: Northern Arc

Solomon Islands

high risk

Pop: 720k

Security agreement signed April 2022. Chinese police deployed. Potential naval access provisions. Wharf upgrades. Australia's closest neighbour in the arc.

· April 2022: Security agreement signed

· June 2023: Chinese police personnel deployed to Honiara

· 2024: Manele Bay wharf upgrade linked to Chinese contractor

The first PLA-capable logistics facility in the near Pacific would be in Honiara, 1,700km from Brisbane. This is the book's paradigm case for why the Northern Arc matters.

Kiribati

high risk

Pop: 120k

President Maamau aligned with Beijing since 2019 recognition switch. IPA Kanton Island airstrip of potential dual use. Withdrew from Pacific Islands Forum 2022.

· 2019: Diplomatic recognition switched from Taiwan to PRC

· 2022: Withdrew from Pacific Islands Forum

· 2023: IPA Kanton airfield upgrade discussions

· 2024: Refuses Australian surveillance overflights

Kiribati's Phoenix Islands span 4.5 million km² of maritime domain in the central Pacific. Chinese airfield access would threaten US Hawaii-Guam logistics.

Papua New Guinea

low risk

Pop: 10,300k

Australia's most important Pacific partner. Resisted Chinese security advances. Manus Island strategic significance. US Marines access secured 2023.

· 2023: US defence cooperation agreement signed

· 2023: US Marines rotating through Lombrum (Manus)

· 2024: PNG-Australia Defence Cooperation Treaty upgraded

Manus Island is the key. Lombrum Naval Base with US and Australian presence denies Chinese access to the critical western Pacific choke point.

Vanuatu

medium risk

Pop: 330k

BRI infrastructure. Luganville port dual-use concerns raised by Australian intelligence. Significant Chinese diaspora business community.

· 2018: Luganville wharf upgrade (Chinese-funded)

· 2020: Reports of Chinese military access discussions (denied)

· 2024: New PM Kalsakau pro-Western; reduced risk

Luganville has deep-water port capability. Chinese access would extend reconnaissance into Australia's northeast maritime approaches.

Tonga

medium risk

Pop: 105k

Chinese debt pressure from BRI infrastructure loans. Undersea cable contract with Chinese firm. Riots 2021 targeted Chinese businesses.

· 2020: Chinese-funded undersea cable to Fiji

· 2021: Anti-Chinese riots in Nuku'alofa

· 2023: Tonga requests debt relief from China

Tonga sits astride the Auckland-Samoa-Hawaii maritime axis. Chinese economic leverage creates coercive potential.

Tuvalu

medium risk

Pop: 11k

Tuvalu-Australia Falepili Union signed 2023 — Australia guarantees sovereignty, Tuvalu grants exclusive strategic partnership. Model for Pacific Compact.

· November 2023: Falepili Union signed

· 2024: Implementation begins — climate migration pathway, defence cooperation

The Falepili Union is the book's Pillar 8 model in action. Securing Tuvalu's maritime domain for ~A$100M/year is among the highest-value strategic investments available.

Grey Zone Activities

China's grey zone toolkit — maritime militia incursions, cyber campaigns, economic coercion, disinformation — is deployed continuously below the threshold of armed conflict. Full grey zone activity tracking launches in Phase 4+.

ASIO foreign interference assessments

China #1 threat

2020 economic coercion sectors

8 (barley, wine, coal, beef...)

Chinese state media Weibo accounts targeting AUS

>3,000 (est.)